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ABSTRACT 
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The fashion industry is one of the most labor-intensive industries in the world – for 
example: the labor costs of clothing production make up about 60 % of total clothing 
production costs. Because of this, fashion companies have long since been outsourcing 
their production activities to countries with lower labor costs in order to achieve cost 
savings. As a result, today’s fashion supply chains can be described as complex and 
globally dispersed with often long lead times. 
 
Although the production shift to more low-cost countries has enabled fashion 
companies to reduce their production costs, the long lead times have brought about 
other problems. These problems are related to demand forecasting. Fashion industry is 
an industry that is characterized by constantly changing trends, erratic consumer 
behavior and quick loss of product value. With the development of digital media, all of 
this has only been accentuated. Yet with the long times, fashion companies struggle to 
get their forecasts right. Consequently, approximately one third of fashion companies’ 
products do not correspond with the demand and end up being sold with discounted 
prices or donated to charity. Also, it is often impossible for the fashion companies to 
reorder their more popular products because the delivery would take too long and 
because of the capital invested in the yet unsold, unpopular products. 
 
In this study, the fashion industry’s traditional production networks are looked into as 
well as the possibilities of shorter supply chains and a more local production approach. 
This study is carried out as a literature review and consists of two parts: first, of a 
general overview of fashion industry’s production networks and reasons behind the 
attractiveness of offshore production and second, of case studies of fashion companies 
with shorter supply chains. This study is conducted from the perspective of the more 
high-cost areas of the fashion industry (here: parts of EU and also, US).  
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Muotiteollisuus on yksi maailman työvoimavaltaisimmista teollisuudenaloista. 
Esimerkiksi: vaatetuotannon työvoimakulut kattavat keskimäärin noin 60 % 
vaatetuotannon kokonaiskuluista. Tästä johtuen muotiyritykset ovat jo pitkään 
ulkoistaneet tuotantoaan halvemman työvoimakustannusten maihin kustannussäästöjen 
toivossa. Nykypäivän muotiteollisuuden toimitusketjuja voidaankin näin ollen kuvailla 
monimutkaisiksi, maailmanlaajuisesti hajanaisiksi ja pitkät läpimenoajat omaaviksi. 
 
Vaikka tuotannon siirtyminen halvempien työvoimakustannusten maihin on 
mahdollistanut muotiyrityksille pienemmät tuotantokustannukset, globaaliin tuotantoon 
liittyvät pitkät läpimenoajat ovat tuoneet mukanaan muita ongelmia. Nämä ongelmat 
liittyvät kysynnän ennustamiseen. Muotiteollisuus on teollisuudenala, jota leimaa 
jatkuvasti vaihtuvat trendit, epävakaa ja ennalta-arvaamaton kuluttajakäyttäytyminen 
sekä nopea tuotteen arvon laskeminen. Digitaalisen median nopean kehityksen myötä 
kaikki tämä on korostunut entisestään. Pitkistä läpimenoajoista johtuen muotiyritykset 
joutuvat kuitenkin ponnistelemaan kysyntäennusteidensa kanssa. Sen seurauksena 
keskimäärin noin yksi kolmasosa muotiyritysten tuotteista ei vastaa kysyntää ja päätyy 
alennusmyynteihin tai hyväntekeväisyyteen. Tämän lisäksi muotiyritykset eivät 
myöskään usein voi tilata täydennyksiä suositummista tuotteistaan, sillä toimitukseen 
menisi liian kauan aikaa ja toisaalta, koska pääoma on edelleen kiinni huonosti 
myyvissä, kysyntää vastaamattomissa tuotteissa. 
 
Tämän diplomityön tarkoitus on tarkastella muotiteollisuuden perinteisiä 
tuotantoverkostoja sekä tutkia lyhyempien toimitusketjujen ja paikallisemman 
tuotannon  tarjoamia mahdollisuuksia. Työ on toteutettu kirjallisuuskatsauksena, ja se 
koostuu kahdesta osasta: yleiskatsauksesta muotiteollisuuden toimitusverkkoihin ja 
syihin tuotannon ulkoistamiselle sekä kahden lyhyitä toimitusketjuja suosivan case-
yrityksen tarkastatelusta. Työ on toteutettu muotiteollisuuden korkeampien 
kustannusten alueiden (tässä: osa EU:sta/USA) näkökulmasta. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
The fashion industry is one of the biggest industries in the world. Characterized by 
multinational and complex supply chains, seasonal nature and low predictability in 
terms of consumer demand, it is also a very challenging industry. During the past few 
decades, the fashion industry has undergone drastic changes and a big portion of 
production and other jobs have shifted to the developing world. As a result, the 
European and US clothing industries’ employment has concurrently decreased. For 
example in the US, the number of employees in the country’s clothing sector has come 
down by 83 % within the last 20 years [1]. Respectively in the European Union, the 
employment in the textile and clothing industry in 2004 was around 2,2 million people 
and in 2013 only around 1,7 million people – despite the fact that new members have 
joined the EU during that time frame [2].  
 
Some of these jobs have been lost due to developments in factory automation and 
general economic downturn, but the trend of settling production offshore to low-cost 
countries is nevertheless obvious. The World Trade Organization’s international trade 
statistics tell the same story: China’s clothing exports have for example grown by 
almost 400 % from 2000 to 2013 and India’s clothing exports have increased by almost 
200 % between that time, too (see Table 1.1 for precise numbers) [3].  
 
Table 1.1: Bangladesh’s, China’s and India’s textile and clothing exports (partner: 
world) in 2000 and 2013 (adapted from [3]). 
Country Commodity Value 2000 [Million US $] Value 2013 [Million US $] 
Bangladesh Textiles 393 1893 
Bangladesh Clothing 5067 23501 
China Textiles 16135 106578 
China Clothing 36071 177435 
India Textiles 5593 18907 
India Clothing 5965 16843 
 
Although the production shift to low-cost countries has helped textile and clothing 
companies save in their labor costs, it has also created new challenges in regards to 
supply chain management and forecasting of demand. Especially in the fashion sector, 
where adequate forecasting is of vital importance, the longer lead times are a real 
problem. With conventional sourcing, the total lead times can stretch up to 9 to 10 
months. As the long lead times are the main reason for forecasts errors (i.e. incorrectly 
estimated demand), for example approximately one third of fashion retailers’ products 
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do not correspond with the demand and need to be sold with discounted prices or 
donated to charity. [4; 5] 
 
To address this issue, fashion companies have implemented different sourcing strategies 
and operation management styles over the years. For example, the so-called lean 
systems have gained popularity because of their demand driven and flexible approach. 
Yet according to research, it seems that fashion companies could, by engaging 
themselves partly or fully in a more local production and shorter supply chains, better 
their forecasting and profitability even more. [5; 6] 
 
Although the more local production approach has its advantages, reshoring textile and 
clothing production back to the Western countries has never really been a major theme 
in the public discussion – at least not until recently. According to recent research, the 
wage gap between Western and developing countries is going to get substantially 
narrower in the coming years. This will have a significant impact on global businesses, 
as they are forced to reconsider their production strategies. Also, another factor global 
businesses need to take account of are the constantly rising energy and transportation 
costs, which, too, make shorter supply chains seem more appealing. [7; 8] Because of 
these issues plus the overall concern about the working conditions in low-cost countries 
and the growing need for domestic jobs, reshoring initiatives have emerged both in the 
U.S. as well as in Europe. 
 
The Reshoring Initiative is an U.S. industry-led endeavor founded in 2010 that aims at 
bringing production (not just textile and clothing, but manufacturing jobs in general) 
back to the United States. They state that years of offshoring have caused a huge deficit 
in the U.S. trade balance. As a result, the unemployment rate has increased substantially 
and the deficit in the federal budget continues to grow. They argue that by reshoring, 
both companies as well as the nation could improve their situation: companies could for 
example tackle production’s quality issues easier and respond to changes in demand a 
lot quicker. Also, the whole nation would benefit from new jobs, which could 
strengthen the industrial base and help balance out the budget deficit. [9] 
 
Whether or not the Reshoring Initiative will actually succeed in its mission remains to 
be seen. Nonetheless, the U.S. trade deficit is an actual problem and, according to some 
standpoints, one of the reasons behind the financial crisis of 2008 [10; 11]. And it is not 
only the United States that has been overpowered by the Asian imports: the European 
Union, by the same token, has for example a significant trade deficit with China – as 
shown in Figure 1.1 [10; 12]. So, from this perspective, it is no wonder that motions 
similar to the Reshoring Initiative have also arisen in the EU. One example of these 
motions is the Horizon 2020 -program. It is a European Union funded program that 
aims at creating growth and new jobs within the EU so that European companies could 
enhance their position in the global market. [13] 
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Figure 1.1: EU’s exports and imports [in billion €] to and from China between 2002 
and 2013 (*estimate) [12]. 
 
Similarly to the Reshoring Initiative and Horizon 2020 -programs, this study will focus 
on the aforementioned possible benefits of shorter supply chains for fashion retailers, 
discuss whether it is something fashion retailers should look into more and examine 
how fashion companies who already prefer more local production have organized their 
operations. In addition to this, the troubles related to forecasting of demand with long 
lead times and the societal and environmental effects of offshoring of production are 
also briefly discussed in this study in order the get a better understanding of the fashion 
industry as a whole. The study starts with a literature review regarding fashion 
industry’s current state, characteristics and reasons behind offshoring of production, and 
then moves on to actual case companies. In the end of this study, the findings are 
analyzed and results about whether shorter supply chains actually are beneficial for 
fashion retailers are discussed. 
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2 STUDY DETAILS 
2.1 Research Objectives & Questions 
The aim of this study is to give an understanding of fashion industry’s production 
networks and especially, to gain knowledge about whether the benefits of global supply 
chains and offshore production truly overshadow a more local production approach. In 
order to achieve this aim, the study has been divided into smaller, more concrete 
objectives, which are: 
 
• Provide an overview of fashion industry’s current situation in the global 
market and the main reasons behind the attractiveness of offshore 
production in low-cost countries. 
• Understand and analyze the disadvantages that the global supply chains and 
production entail. 
 
From these objectives stem then the actual research questions of this study, which are: 
 
RQ1: What are the benefits shorter supply chains could offer for a fashion retailer? 
 
RQ2: What are the factors a fashion retailer considering shorter supply should pay 
attention to? 
2.2 Research Scope & limitations 
 
Textile and clothing industry as a whole is a large and diverse industry with a lot 
different actors and products. However, the main focus of this study is only on one 
specific sector of the whole industry – the fashion industry. One of the goals of this 
study is to get a proper picture of fashion industry as an industry so that the problems 
and possibilities related to it can be adequately analyzed. The chosen case companies on 
their part help bring forth a more concrete example of fashion retailers and the shorter 
supply chains. This study is conducted from the perspective of the more high-cost areas 
of the fashion industry (here: parts of EU and also, US), which are among the areas that 
have been affected by the outsourcing of labor to offshore locations. 
 
As this study is conducted mainly as a literature review, the main limitations related to 
this study are possible misinterpretation of used information and also, lack of existing 
research and firsthand information. Other limitations include the lack of detailed 
corporate information about the case companies and due to this, lack of other than 
vertically integrated fashion retailers in the case companies. 
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2.3 Study method 
There are different types of researches existing and depending on the research and its 
objectives, different approaches and methods apply. According to Neville [14], 
researches can be divided into four categories: exploratory, descriptive, analytical and 
predictive research. The key elements and the main differences between these four 
categories are described below: 
 
Exploratory research comes in question when only few or no previous studies have 
been carried out on the given subject. In exploratory research, the goal is to come up 
with patterns and hypotheses that can be tested and used as a foundation for future 
research. This kind of research typically involves case studies and reviewing earlier 
studies related to the subject. [14] 
 
Descriptive research is carried out when different elements and attributes of a given 
subject need to be looked into and identified. As this kind of research does not go into 
the reasons behind these elements – it merely recognizes their existence – quantitative 
research techniques are usually used for data collection and analysis. [14] 
 
Analytical research can be seen as an extension of descriptive research. The goal of 
analytical research is to find out why and how something takes place. In this kind of 
research, it is important to acknowledge all the different factors related to the subject in 
order to be able to make right and plausible conclusions. [14] 
 
Like the name itself suggest, in predictive research, future possibilities are discussed 
and speculated. Existing evidence of cause and effect needs to be analyzed thoroughly 
before assumptions of the future can be made. [14] 
 
There has been reasonable amount of research about fashion industry’s supply chain 
management. Yet the main focus on the existing research has been more on how to 
make the long, offshore supply chains as effective as possible and not so much on the 
benefits of shorter supply chains for fashion retailers. Therefore, there is e.g. not that 
much statistical data available on this study’s topic and other than quantitative measures 
are needed to consider the possible benefits of the shorter supply chains. In other words, 
due to the lack of existing research and resources available, this study is rather a general 
overview of fashion industry’s characteristics and possibilities of shorter supply chains, 
not an extremely detailed report with precise numbers and clear, undeniable 
conclusions. So, with this in mind, this study clearly falls in the exploratory research 
category.  
 
As is customary to exploratory research, this study is conducted by reviewing existing 
literature related to the study subject and using case examples. According to Baumeister 
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and Leary [15, see 16], there are several reasons for literature reviews. For example, 
with help of literature reviews, existing theory on a given subject can be challenged and 
new theory can be developed. In terms of this study, the literature review is used to help 
paint a big picture of fashion industry as an entity and to identify some of its problems – 
both among the uses for literature review mentioned by Baumeister and Leary. Also, 
without the literature review, it would not be possible to make any kind of presumptions 
or arguments on the study’s subject.  
 
The case studies then again are used to, also due to the lack of existing research, form a 
better understanding of a particular topic within the study’s subject – here, fashion 
industry’s shorter supply chains – as well as improve the theory in the literature review 
by presenting actual, practical examples. Data for case studies can, depending on the 
case in question, be gathered from multiple different sources. [17] In this study, used 
data includes existing research and articles focusing on the case companies, the case 
companies’ own public statements and also, financial data about the case companies.   
2.4 Study structure & outline 
This study starts with an introduction chapter. The purpose of that chapter is to 
introduce the reader to the subject and highlight some challenges fashion industry is 
facing in terms of supply chains management. After that, the study details, starting with 
the research questions, are presented. The questions stem from the challenges 
mentioned in the introduction chapter. Other study details presented in the second 
chapter include study structure, scope, method and limitations. Then, to be able to 
provide plausible answers to the research questions, the study continues to a literature 
review, which handles the current state and characteristics of fashion industry and its 
production networks. The purpose of the literature review is to gain a profound 
understanding of the industry so that the case studies can be properly analyzed. The 
purpose of the case studies then again is to study if and how shorter supply chains could 
be implemented in practice. The case studies are discussed after the literature review 
and after that, an analysis based on both the findings of the literature review as well as 
the case studies is conducted. Finally, the study ends with a conclusion chapter that 
sums up the research and its results. A general structure of the study is presented in 
Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: Study structure 
 
The study structure has been outlined into the following chapters: 
 
Chapter 1 provides background information about the chosen subject and reasons for 
doing this research.  
 
Chapter 2 presents the research objectives and questions as well as the scope, structure 
and limitations of the research. The study methodology is also discussed in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 3 studies the current state of fashion industry, its production networks and 
reasons behind offshore production. Research regarding benefits related to shorter 
supply chains is also presented within this chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on two case examples – Zara and American Apparel – and their 
outtake on fashion retailing. 
 
Chapter 5 analyses the findings from chapter 3 and 4 from the research questions’ 
point of view. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions of this study. 
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3 OVERVIEW OF FASHION INDUSTRY’S 
PRODUCTION NETWORKS 
The purpose of this chapter is to get an understanding of how fashion industry’s 
production networks work, what kind of actors they consist of and what are the reasons 
behind the outsourcing of labor that is very typical in this field of industry. The social 
and environmental effects of outsourcing into developing countries will briefly be 
discussed, too. This chapter is based on different researches and statistics that deal with 
the characteristics of fashion and clothing industry, its supply chains, problems and 
benefits. It sets up the following chapter that showcases actual case examples and works 
as a foundation for it. 
 
The chapter starts by defining fashion industry and what it means in terms of this study. 
After that it moves on to topics mentioned above – fashion industry’s current state and 
characteristics, supply chains, outsourcing of labor and social and environmental effects 
of outsourcing. At the end of this chapter, researches regarding benefits of shorter 
supply chains are presented, as well as future scenarios for European and US textile and 
clothing (and especially fashion) industry. 
3.1 Defining fashion industry 
Textile and clothing industry is a broad term that entails a lot of different actors and that 
can be divided into many different subcategories. For example, Tahvanainen and 
Pajarinen divide textile and clothing industry into five categories that are based on 
different domains within the industry: textile manufacturing, clothing manufacturing, 
leather and leather product manufacturing, textile care services and retail [18, p. 7]. The 
industry could also be divided into different subcategories based on the different 
activities that occur during a lifespan of a textile and/or clothing product [19]. This kind 
of division could consist of the following activities: 
 
• Production of natural fibers (e.g. cotton, wool, etc.)  
• Manufacture of synthetic fibers (e.g. polyester, acrylic, etc.)  
• Preparation of different fibers for production and/or manufacture of 
yarns 
• Knitting and/or weaving of fabrics 
• Finishing (e.g. bleaching, coating) of fabrics 
• Transformation of fabrics into different products like: 
 - Clothing 
 - Carpets and other floor covering  
 - Home textiles (e.g. bed linen, curtains, etc.) 
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 - Technical and industrial textiles 
• Retail of products [19]    
     
Both of these divisions are adequate as such (although the textile care services are not 
included in the latter division) and reflect well the diversity within the industry. In order 
to keep the entirety of this study within reasonable limits, it focuses on one specific 
sector of the whole textile and clothing industry – the fashion industry.  
 
Fashion is usually understood as the popular style of clothing at a given time, yet even 
that explanation encases a lot different products as can be seen from Figure 3.1 that 
presents the fashion pyramid. The basic commodities presented in Figure 3.1 refer to 
e.g. basic underwear and socks, fashion-basics to e.g. dress shirts, “better” fashion to 
e.g. moderately priced suits, “bridge” fashion to a little higher-priced ready-to-wear 
products, designer collections to expensive ready-to-wear products and finally, haute 
couture to very expensive and custom-made products [20, see 21 p. 3]. As the main 
focus of this study is to get an understanding of fashion industry’s global production 
networks and reasons behind outsourcing of production (as well as benefits of shorter 
supply chains), the products in the fashion-basics, “better” and “bridge” fashion as well 
as the designer collections –categories are the most interesting ones for this study. This 
is because these categories include products that are (more or less) mass-produced 
ready-to-wear products, and they are all subjected to different fashion-related 
fluctuations and unpredictable demand. The basic products are not as severely subjected 
to different trends compared to the other fashion products and therefore, their supply 
chain does not need to be as effective, flexible and quick. The haute couture products on 
the other hand are very expensive custom-made products and their production cannot 
and does not need to be outsourced. 
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Figure 3.1: The fashion pyramid [21]. 
 
The fashion industry itself is its own entity, although fashion industry actors are 
presented in many of the aforementioned subcategories of the whole textile and clothing 
industry from fabric producers to retailers. It is the more the specific features of the 
fashion industry that differentiate it from other sectors of the textile and clothing 
industry – not the actual activities (e.g. fabric or clothing manufacture).  Among these 
features, especially the difficulty of forecasting demand, strong seasonal changes in 
demand, great abundance and variety of products, quick loss of product value and 
the need for quick and flexible production are emphasized.  
 
As for the many different actors within the fashion industry: particularly interesting in 
terms of this study are actors that are in charge of the most value-added activities (see 
Figure 3.2 for value-added stages in the clothing value chain) - like research and 
development, design and marketing for example. Of course producers are not to be 
totally neglected, either: how fashion industry actors organize their production and 
supply chains is, after all, one of the key questions of this whole study. The fact of the 
matter just is that fashion industry’s supply chains are very buyer-driven (a subject that 
will be more thoroughly discussed in chapter 3.4: Fashion industry’s supply chains) 
which means that it is e.g. the branded retailers and marketers who ultimately control 
the supply chain. Therefore, in order to get an understanding of how the fashion 
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industry works in terms of production, we need to focus on the parties that are making 
decisions about the these issues. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Curve of value-added stages in the global value chain of clothing products 
(adapted from [22]). 
3.2 Fashion industry’s key figures and current state (EU & US) 
Before jumping into the specifics of the fashion industry, an overall outline of the 
European and US clothing industry’s key figures and current state is in order. 
 
As already mentioned in the introduction-chapter, the number of fashion companies and 
workers has decreased over the past years both in the European Union as well as in the 
USA. The financial crisis of 2008 has, of course, not helped the situation. In the 
European Union, although the consumption of textile and clothing products has after the 
crisis started to increase again (see Figure 3.3), it this has not been reflected in the 
number of companies and employees of the clothing sector. In 2008, there were 143 463 
clothing companies operating in the European Union but in 2013, the number had 
dropped down to 119 895 (see Figure 3.4). In percentages, this is almost a 16 % drop in 
only five years. The employment has as a result declined similarly, as can be n in Figure 
3.5. [2] 
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Figure 3.3: Household consumption [in bil. €] of textile and clothing products in the 
European Union between 2008 and 2013 (adapted from [2]). 
 
Figure 3.4: Number of clothing companies in the European Union between 2008 and 
2013 (adapted from [2]). 
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Figure 3.5: Number of employees in the European Union’s clothing sector between 
2008 and 2013 (adapted from [2]). 
 
The financial crisis is of course only one reason behind the decrease of both clothing 
companies and employees in the European Union. Already well before the crisis, the 
development was similar due to the trend of outsourcing production into low-cost 
countries such as China and Bangladesh for example. According to Euratex’s statistics, 
the extra-EU imports and exports of clothing seem to have grown at a very similar rate 
over the last few years. Yet as the imports e.g. in 2013 were approximately 220 % 
bigger than the exports, EU’s trade deficit in clothing remains at a staggering -46 billion 
euros (see Figure 3.6). [2] 
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Figure 3.6: Extra-EU clothing imports, exports and trade balance [in bil. €] between 
2008 and 2013 (adapted from [2]). 
 
The financial crisis can also be seen as a reason for the decrease in the average annual 
expenditure on clothing and other related products in the US households (see Figure 
3.7). Still, like in the EU, the downhill of the US clothing industry started well before 
the financial crisis with the outsourcing of production to countries with cheaper 
workforce. As a direct consequence, the US clothing manufacturing base has suffered 
and employment has decreased tremendously over the past decades as can be seen in 
Figure 3.8. In 1990, 902 900 people worked in clothing manufacturing in the US but by 
2011, the number of employees had dropped down to only 151 800. In other words: in 
the course of the last two decades, the employment has dropped by 83 percent. [1] 
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Figure 3.7: Average annual expenditure on clothing, footwear and related products 
and services per US household between 1985-2010 (adapted from [1]). 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Number of employees in the US clothing sector between 1990 and 2011 
(adapted from [1]). 
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Considering the 83 percent decrease in employment in the US clothing manufacturing 
over the past 20 years, it is easy to relate to Figures 3.9 and 3.10 that present the 
productivity of the country’s clothing manufacturing sector (and overall manufacturing 
sector for comparison). Productivity is a pivotal measure of the efficiency of production 
and it can be expressed as the ratio of output per input. For example, manufacturing 
productivity is usually expressed as a ratio of output per an hour of work, and that is 
also the ratio used in both Figure 3.9 and 3.10.  [23; 1] 
 
In Figure 3.9, the productivity of US clothing manufacturing and manufacturing are 
presented without any adjusting for inflation. It is clear that although the overall 
manufacturing productivity has increased over the years, it does not apply for the 
clothing manufacturing. Also, Figure 3.10 has been adjusted for inflation and showcases 
the real output per hour, making the decline in the clothing manufacturing productivity 
even more obvious. [1] 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Productivity as output per hour in US manufacturing versus output per 
hour in US clothing manufacturing between 1987-2010 (adapted from [1]). 
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Figure 3.10: Productivity as real output per hour in US manufacturing versus real 
output per hour in US clothing manufacturing between 1987-2010 (adapted from [1]). 
 
Of course a decrease in inputs (here: hours worked) does not obviously mean poorer 
productivity – it is all about the ratio of output to input. For example, the overall US 
manufacturing productivity grew despite a decrease in working hours (see Figure 3.11 
for reference). Yet clearly this is not the case with US clothing manufacturing. On the 
contrary –it seems that US clothing manufacturing has not only significantly decreased 
in size over the past 20 years but also, become considerably less efficient. In this light, it 
seems understandable that like the EU, US also has a staggering trade deficit in 
clothing: 78,5 billion dollars in 2014 of which -31,5 billion dollars with China [24].  
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Figure 3.11: Hours worked in US manufacturing versus US clothing manufacturing 
between 1987-2010 (adapted from [1]). 
3.3 Industry characteristics  
When talking about the fashion industry, there are some characteristics that differentiate 
it from other industries. One of the most important characteristics of the fashion 
industry is the fact that demand of clothing is growing quite slowly and it is not easily 
predictable. [25; 26] In fact, according to Vogler-Ludwig and Valente, textile, clothing 
and leather product producers and retailers only have very limited control over the 
fashion trends as they are rather created on the streets. Therefore, companies actually 
tend to use so-called fashion scouts to keep themselves up-to-date with the trends. [27, 
p. 26] (Although Tahvanainen and Pajarinen note, that in some cases a company’s brand 
is so strong that it is able to fight against the mainstream fashion trends [18, p. 15]) In 
addition to this, products lose their value quickly and become obsolete due to both 
strong seasonal and fashion-related changes. There are different ranges for men’s, 
women’s and children’s clothing, sportswear etc. so in other words, the variety of 
products is extremely abundant. Also, the ranges can change, depending on the type of 
product, at least every six months but usually even more often. Furthermore, each 
product range comes in different colors and sizes, so there are a lot of different elements 
that the companies must keep track of. [25; 28] 
 
All of the above-mentioned highlight well the diversity of fashion industry. It truly is an 
industry where the difficulty of forecasting demand and the amount of different moving 
elements get accentuated. According to Tahvanainen and Pajarinen, a new phenomenon 
regarding the fashion industry is the shift from different seasons into a seasonless era. 
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This adds up to even more challenges for the fashion companies. Until recently, it was 
typical for the fashion industry that a year was divided into different fashion events (e.g. 
fashion weeks) that predicted the upcoming seasons. These events were participated by 
several actors from the fashion industry and media. However, between these events and 
the actual introduction of the products to mass media, about six months would pass. 
During this six-month time, companies would design and develop their collection so 
that it was suitable for mass production and also, prepare themselves for sales 
promotion. Nowadays though, the rapid development of digital media has changed and 
speeded things up. The introduction of the products to mass media has been replaced by 
a real-time news feed that is sent straight from the fashion week catwalks. This means 
that consumers now get to witness future trends firsthand, which again means that 
demand is created without any kind of delay. For fashion companies, this is of course a 
big challenge and they are forced to reconsider and reinvent their courses of action. 
Collections need to be designed and manufactured considerably quicker than before, as 
new products can enter the stores even as often as every three weeks. [18, p.19] 
 
Because of this, succeeding in the industry is indeed very challenging and as Dunford 
mentions, it is vital for the companies to be adaptable. This can be achieved either 
passively or actively. Passive adaptability includes strategies that focus on increasing 
the value of production capital by simply modifying the firm’s products and services to 
keep up with the changes in the demand. Active adaptability on the other hand entails 
constant launching of new products and features that differentiate the company and its 
offering from those of the competitors. Therefore, the most active companies are the 
ones that continuously innovate and come up with new, unique products others cannot 
compete with. In other words: these companies are able to continuously create small, 
monopolistic rents, which means that these companies can sell their products with 
higher prices than what their actual value is because there are no competitors for the 
products. [25] 
 
Another characteristic that is typical especially for fashion industry is that rather than 
competing with for example plain volume (which is more customary to economies of 
scale), companies focus on flexible specialization. In an industry of constant change and 
unpredictability, companies cannot generate or guarantee profits merely by enhancing 
their operational efficiency through increased output. On the contrary – profits derive 
from thorough research, design, sales and marketing. So, to be able to navigate in this 
kind of environment, companies tend to specialize in certain types of products. That 
way it is easier for them to organize their production flexible enough, so that it can be 
accommodated to the constantly changing demand and trends. [25; 29] 
 
With different companies specializing in different things, a situation where many 
companies can coexist and share the market at the same time is created as a result. It is 
also typical, if the need be, that similar companies form partnerships or co-operate with 
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one another. However, majority of the companies in the market usually are small with 
only a few of them possessing a larger share of the market. According to Euratex, the 
European Apparel and Textile Confederation, in 2013 there where altogether 119 895 
clothing companies operating in the European Union with little over a million 
employees.  Yet as approximately 80 % of these companies are either small or medium-
sized, one company only employs about 18 persons on average [2, see 5]. These small 
companies do not necessarily have the means and resources to fully access the financial 
markets, which in turn makes it difficult for these companies to grow. Respectively, the 
few bigger companies are the ones that ultimately control the market. [25; 2; 5] 
3.4 Fashion industry’s supply chains 
A supply chain refers to all the activities, companies and people related to a product 
throughout its journey from production to the end consumer [26, p. 152]. As for the 
fashion industry – it has not always been the case that a small number of big players 
controlled the market: the situation did not come about until power over the production 
networks shifted from the producers to the buyers. According to Gereffi, global 
industrial networks can be divided into producer-driven and buyer-driven supply chains 
(or according to Gereffi: commodity chains), which are presented in Figure 3.12. In 
producer-driven supply chains, the manufacturers are in charge of the production 
networks. To be able to execute this, the manufacturers are usually multinational and 
big in size. This is also part of the reason why producer-driven supply chains are typical 
in industries that are capital- and technology-intensive – like the automobile or airplane 
industry for example. In buyer-driven supply chains on the other hand, large retailers 
and branded marketers and manufacturers are the ones that organize the production 
networks. The actual production is usually located in developing countries and executed 
by gradual networks of contractors that specialize in making consumer goods according 
to the requirements of the foreign buyers. Buyer-driven supply chains are therefore 
typical in labor-intensive industries such as clothing and footwear industries for 
example. [29] 
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Figure 3.12: Producer- and buyer-driven commodity chains (adapted, with a minor 
alteration (US changed to domestic), from [29]). 
 
As stated earlier, the supply chains of textile and clothing industry have changed over 
the years. In the past, the supply chain of textile and clothing products was producer-
driven and the manufacturing industry was powerful. The producers, who determined 
the prices and sold their collections to small or medium-sized retailers, controlled the 
distribution. Today, this no longer applies. The supply chain has become more buyer-
driven which has left the distribution sector, and also the final consumers, with more 
power. The number of small, independent retailers has declined and in turn, specialized 
chain stores and hyper- and supermarkets have emerged (see an older Table 3.1 
regarding the European Union and a more recent Table 3.2 regarding U.S.). The 
distribution is now controlled by a small number of big players, who are able to put the 
producers under significant amount of pressure. [25] 
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Table 3.1: Clothing sales (in percentages) in EU15 by type of outlet (adapted from 
[25]).  
EU15 
  1988 1996 2000 
Independent retailers 48 % 41 % 37 % 
Specialized chains 18 % 24 % 26 % 
Department and variety stores 12 % 13 % 13 % 
Hypermarkets and supermarkets 5 % 6 % 7 % 
Mail order 7 % 8 % 9 % 
Other 10 % 8 % 8 % 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Table 3.2: U.S. clothing sales by retail channel 2010-2011 (adapted from [30]). 
 
 
 
The shift from producer-driven to buyer-driven supply chains has also increased the 
number of different types of actors in the industry. As a result, today’s fashion supply 
chains can be described as very long and complex, as they combine a lot different 
parties globally [30, see 26, p. 155]. According to Mattila, the supply chain of fashion 
products can be divided into production and retail clusters and middlemen, who bring 
these two clusters together. These are all presented in Figure 3.13. [28] 
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Figure 3.13: Fashion supply chain clusters [28]. 
 
The production cluster can further be divided into three different subcategories: 
private label, full package and CM / CMT, which stands for cut & make / cut, make & 
trim –producers. Private label producers are producers, who manufacture products for a 
buying company under the buying company’s own brand. Full package producers are 
producers, who manufacture products according to the requirements of the buying 
company, but not under the buying company’s brand. Both the private label and the full 
package producers need to have adequate technical and material know-how, as they are 
e.g. responsible for acquiring the material for the products. The CM / CMT –producers 
simply cut and make (and trim) the products for a buying company using material that 
the buying company has acquired for them. So, if a buying company chooses to use CM 
/ CMT –producers, they must self have enough technical and material understanding to 
be able to provide the producers with proper material and technical product 
requirements. [28] 
 
The middlemen consist of trading firms, branded manufacturers and branded 
marketers. They usually do not take part in the actual production nor do they own any 
production facilities – they simply trade either their own or their customers’ brands. 
Trading firms help source products for e.g. branded retailers. In other words: they act 
as true middlemen and help bring producers and retailers together. With the increasing 
globalization of the fashion industry, these trading firms are becoming more and more 
common and also, necessary, in the long fashion supply chains [26, p. 155]. Branded 
manufacturers possess a lot of technical and material know-how, but they consider the 
actual production a service that can be outsourced and therefore, rather focus on 
strengthening their brand. They design their own products, which are sold under their 
own brand to different retailers, but the production is usually carried out by CM / CMT 
–producers, according to the requirements of the branded manufacturers. Branded 
marketers have also outsourced their production but usually to full package producers, 
as they do not possess the same kind of technical and material know-how as the branded 
manufacturers do. Their strengths lie more in their brand, its design and marketing. 
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They, too, design their own products and sell them under their own brand to different 
retailers. [28] 
 
In the retail cluster there are branded retailers, vertical companies and multibrand 
retailers. Like branded marketers, branded retailers also source their products from 
suitable producers, but they also sell their own products. They don’t usually have the 
technical know-how for e.g. CM –sourcing, so they rather use full package or private 
label producers and also, trading firms. Vertical companies are companies that own a 
large part of their own supply chain. In other words: they are retailers, but they also 
carry out some production and own some production facilities. Multibrand retailers 
buy products from branded manufacturers and marketers and sell them. [28] In terms of 
this study, it is the retail and the middlemen clusters that are especially looked into, as 
those are the clusters that hold the most power over the supply chains. 
 
The shift towards buyer-driven supply chains in the fashion industry is also reflected in 
the power distribution between the three categories that were described above: the retail 
cluster and the middlemen usually possess the most control over the supply chains, 
leaving the producers with relatively little or no power. For example: branded retailers, 
marketers and manufacturers are all in charge of both their design and product 
development (i.e. most of the value-added activities). They possess a lot of information 
about the market and strive towards being market-driven. Therefore, they need 
dependable producers who are able to deliver them products according to their 
requirements. In order to achieve this, the retailers usually deal with different producers 
through centralized buying and exert pressure on them in terms of product prices, 
quality and delivery schedules [32, see 26, p. 155]. They have managed to control and 
mold consumers’ preferences with their strong brands, which has lead to a situation 
where the retail sector has become powerful and therefore, able to arrange the fashion 
supply chain so that their profitability is insured. [25; 28; 29] 
 
So today, retailers are not merely clothing manufacturers’ customers but rather 
competitors and employers. Already in 1992, Germany’s five largest clothing retailers 
made up 28 % of the country’s economy. Correspondingly in 1994 in the UK, the 
country’s two main clothing retailers had a 25 % share of the market. Or most 
significantly in the US: in 1995, 68 % of the country’s clothing sales were made by its 
five largest retailers. The situation is still the same today. This is reflected e.g. in Figure 
3.14 presenting US consumer’s favorite clothing retail chains. Although Figure 3.14 
does not offer a full view of US clothing retail – it only showcases consumer 
preferences of 14 selected clothing retailers – it still acts as a good example of how a 
few retailers have been able to gain huge market shares. According to Gereffi, the main 
reason behind the retail sector growing and getting so powerful is the way that it has 
utilized global sourcing. As final consumers continuously demand more and better 
value, the buying organizations (e.g. branded retailers etc.) have been forced to take a 
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more active part in the offshore sourcing. With this more active involvement of the 
retailing sector, the competition between all the retailers, marketers and manufactures 
has tightened. Also, the conventional roles of these companies have changed and 
become less apparent, which is also reflected in the relations of the supply chain. [29] 
 
 
Figure 3.14: USA’s favorite fashion retailers according to Market Force Study [33]. 
 
In order to better their position in the market, many textile, clothing and leather product 
producers have then shifted their operations into that of a more brand-based company. 
This means that they now operate through trading rather than the actual production. 
Vogler-Ludwig and Valente contribute this change to the fashion industry’s price 
structures. As was discussed above, the current market is dominated by wholesale and 
retail trade, and producers are left with only a small share of the market. Of these two, 
trading is the more profitable activity and production on the hand, due to globalization 
and offshoring, internationally very competitive. [27, p. 11] 
3.4.1 Issues related to offshore production  
 
Companies outsource parts of their business in order to obtain different kinds of profits 
and benefits. Of these profits and benefits, better return on capital employed (ROCE) is 
one of the main reasons behind outsourcing. Cost savings are often aimed at, too. In the 
case of cost savings, outsourcing production to developing countries can be seen as 
profitable due to lower unit costs. [34, p. 7]  
 
As for fashion: it is one the most global industries today. In clothing production, labor 
costs make up 60 % of total production costs [25, p. 14]. From this point of view, it is 
easy to understand why fashion industry was one of the fist industries to outsource 
 26 
production to developing countries with lower labor costs ever since the beginning of 
1970s. As a result, e.g. according to American Apparel and Footwear Association 
(AAFA), in 2013 an astonishing 97,5 % of the clothing products sold in the US were 
made internationally [35]. Many developing countries in the beginning of their 
industrialization still turn specifically to clothing manufacturing as means to attract 
foreign investors and boost their economy. [25; 36]  
 
According to Gereffi, outsourcing production to countries with cheaper workforce is 
very typical for industries with buyer-driven supply chains – such as the fashion 
industry for example. With these kinds of industries, the products manufactured are not 
very technologically advanced and the scale and volume of operation are constricted.  
This again means that profits are generated with other means like thorough research, 
design and marketing for example. The retailers, branded marketers and branded 
manufactures, who are in charge of these activities, have thereby gained control over the 
supply chains with help of their strong brand names and marketing skills. [29] 
 
In terms of profitability of the global supply chains, it is according to Gereffi highest in 
the most concentrated parts of the chains where market entry is harder for new firms. In 
the clothing and fashion industry, entry barriers are usually low for the actual clothing 
factories but significantly higher for e.g. textile and fiber producers at the very 
beginning of the chain or for branded manufacturers, marketers and retailers at the end 
of the chain. Gereffi notes that leading firms take advantage of this barrier to entry and 
use it to create different rents (as in “returns from scarce assets” [29, p. 43]). Whereas 
producer-driven supply chains rely more on for example technology rents (rents that 
companies, who posses better access to the main product and process technologies than 
competitors, can generate), the rents generated in the buyer-driven supply chains are not 
directly production-related and rather refer to relational, trade-policy and brand name 
rents. [29] 
 
Relational rents mean rents that are generated by linking bigger assembling companies 
with small- and medium-sized businesses in order to create strategic alliances and close 
gatherings of smaller firms with shared efficiency. In other words, relational rent could 
be described as rents that can be generated with help of specific partnerships and 
advanced supply chain management. The fashion industry’s buyer-driven supply chains 
are typically very competitive with locally owned production facilities and complicated, 
globally dispersed production networks. Therefore, leading retailers, branded marketers 
and branded manufacturers need to operate as intermediaries who link offshore 
producers with new, upcoming product niches. Trade-policy rents on the other hand 
refer to a so-called scarcity value that is generated through for example apparel quotas 
and other protectionist trade restrictions. Nowadays however, the protectionism in the 
fashion industry has decreased and e.g. quotas (between WTO nations) were removed 
on January 1, 2005 [36, p. 3]. Brand name rents are rents that are created by 
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successfully differentiating own brand name from those of the competitors and thereby 
gaining leverage in the global markets. [29] 
 
One consequence of the outsourcing of production and the power shift to the retailing 
sector has been the change in product prices. In the 1980’s, retailers started to engage 
themselves in the sourcing of private label products (or “store-brand products” [29, p. 
46]). This means that they came up with their own brand and products, which the 
private label producers then manufactured according to the retailers’ instructions. As 
Matttila has noted, the retailers do not usually posses a lot of material and technical 
know-how, it was reasonable for them to use private label producers, who were e.g. in 
charge of the acquisition of material for the products [28, p. 19]. These private label 
products were then sold more cheaply than national brands, yet they still turned out to 
be more profitable for the retailers. This is because by transforming their operations into 
private label sourcing, the retailers could get rid of some now unnecessary middlemen 
in their supply chain. [28; 29] As a result, the market became even more competitive 
and the pressure for cheaper products grew stronger. 
 
In Figure 3.15, the change in overall US consumer prices and US clothing prices 
between 1987 and 2013 is compared. Even though the total consumer prices have 
increased throughout the years, this is not the case with clothing – on the contrary, the 
clothing prices have increased relatively little. It is clear from the figure that consumer 
prices for clothing have been kept down despite the increase in overall consumer prices 
due to the cheap imports from low-cost countries.   
 
 
Figure 3.15: Change in US consumer prices (total & apparel) between 1987-2013 [37] 
 
Figure 3.16 also highlights not only the relatively small change in clothing consumer 
prices as did figure 3.15, but also the difference between the price of a domestic and 
imported clothing product. Due to the cheap labor costs that cover 60 % of total 
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production costs [25, p.14], imported items can be sold a lot cheaper than domestically 
(here: in the U.S.) produced items. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.16: Comparison between average domestic [here: US] and import prices for 
women’s swimwear between 1991-2005 [38]. 
 
Not only is the trend of outsourcing production to low-cost countries apparent when 
considering the reasons behind the cheap consumer prices of Figure 3.15 and 3.16, it 
can be seen from Table 3.3, which presents the leading exporters of clothing between 
1980-2010, too. Although EU still was the second biggest exporter of clothing in 2010, 
is should be noted that its share of the world’s clothing exports has actually gotten 
smaller from 2000 to 2010 whereas for example China has doubled its share during that 
same ten-year time frame. Also, other developing countries like Bangladesh or Vietnam 
for example have been able to grow their share of exports over the years while US’s 
share in 2010 only covered 1,2 %. All this tells about the production jobs moving from 
the high-cost areas to the more low-cost locations. 
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Table 3.3: Leading clothing exporters in 2010 (adapted from [39]). 
  
Value [Billion US $] Share in world exports [percentage] 
2010  1980 1990 2000 2010 
China 130 4.0 % 8.9 % 18.3 % 36.9 % 
EU (27) 99  -  - 28.5 % 28.1 % 
   extra-EU exports 22  -  - 6.6 % 6.3 %  
Bangladesh 16 0.0 % 0.6 % 2.6 % 4.5 % 
Turkey 13 0.3 % 3.1 % 3.3 % 3.6 % 
India 11 1.7 % 2.3 % 3.0 % 3.2 % 
Vietnam 11  -  - 0.9 % 3.1 % 
Indonesia 7 0.2 % 1.5 % 2.4 % 1.9 % 
United States 5 3.1 % 2.4 % 4.4 % 1.3 % 
Mexico 4 0.0 % 0.5 % 4.4 % 1.2 % 
Above 9 296       84.1 % 
 
According to consumer research, it seems like consumers attitudes and preferences 
would be changing and thereby possibly forcing global fashion companies to reconsider 
their supply chain and pricing policies and general courses of action. Consumers for 
example seem to be better aware of the markets and want to interact more with the 
clothing companies in order to express their wishes in terms of e.g. product quality and 
design. They also seem to claim more socially and ecologically responsible operating 
methods from the companies. Lastly, perhaps because of improved standard of living, 
consumers seem to make purchase decisions based not so much on their actual needs, 
but more on their emotions and more erratically. [40, see 27] 
 
Vogled-Ludwig and Valente note however, that despite the changing attitudes in 
consumer research, these attitudes are yet to be reflected in the actual consumer 
behavior. They point out that clothing prices have remained low and are rather declining 
while the amount of cheap import products keeps on growing. They also argue, that 
there are no indicators that the actual consumer behavior is going to change anytime 
soon – on the contrary, consumers will rather remain as price-conscious as ever and the 
only changing variable seems to be their preferences towards different fashion trends. 
[27] 
 
So, according to the actual consumer behavior, demand for cheap fashion products 
seems to prevail. In the case of the fashion companies however, the savings on 
production costs are no longer enough to enable these companies to sell their products 
at affordable prices. With the rise of digital media, new trends can be created within the 
matter of days. If companies want to engage themselves in the production of these 
trends, they need to operate fast. Therefore, as Dvorak and van Paasschen ([41], 
according to Mattila [4]) note that in addition to cheap offshore products and purchases, 
in order to survive in the competitive fashion markets, companies have to excel at 
supply chain and inventory management, too. Companies need to have their supplier 
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deliverer them products in the right amounts quickly and effectively, not only at a low 
price. [41, see 4, p. 2] With this new, practically seasonless era of fast fashion combined 
with the demand for cheap products, companies might be facing new challenges related 
to offshore production. 
 
A forecast error results from incorrectly estimated demand in relation to actual demand. 
It can be both positive and negative. A positive forecast error results from excess buying 
in relation to actual demand and leads to unsold goods and goods sold at discounted 
prices. A negative forecast error is, in turn, an outcome of insufficient buying in relation 
to actual demand and causes lost sales. Both the goods sold at discounted prices and lost 
sales have, obviously, a negative impact on revenue. With conventional sourcing, a 
fashion company’s total lead times can stretch up to 9 to 10 months. When purchase 
decisions are done that well in advance, companies struggle to get their forecasts right: 
the longer the lead times are, the bigger is the change for forecast errors (both positive 
and negative). This relationship between lead times and forecast errors is presented in 
Figure 3.17. [4; 6] 
 
 
Figure 3.17: Lead time’s effect on forecast accuracy [4]. 
 
To address this issue related to the long lead times and offshore sourcing, fashion 
companies have come up with different sourcing strategies and operation management 
styles. For example, the so-called lean systems have gained some popularity because of 
their demand driven and flexible approach. The idea of lean systems is to achieve a 
well-balanced system by utilizing available resources (both secular and physical) in the 
most effective way possible [42, p. 622]. Yet despite the more effective sourcing 
strategies, some challenges still remain. For example, according to research, 
approximately one third of clothing companies’ purchases still end up being sold with 
discounted prices because of incorrectly forecasted demand [5, p. 1; 18, p. 26]. As the 
average discount is 50 %, these discounted products do not generate any gross margin 
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for the companies [18, p.26]. Also, because of the capital invested in the unsold 
products, companies cannot reorder the more popular products and even if they could, 
the replenishments would not make it to stores in time due to the long lead times. This 
again results to lost sales, which have an even more negative effect on the gross margin 
than the discounted products do, because discounted products can, even with the 
discounts, still be sold. [5] 
 
All these problems raise questions about the profitability of offshore production and the 
long lead times. Also, if other problems related to offshore production – like e.g. the 
rising energy and transportation costs [8], the narrowing wage gap between developed 
and developing countries [7] and general issues related to working conditions in the 
low-cost countries – are also taken into consideration, alternative sourcing strategies 
with shorter supply chains might actually offer some interesting possibilities for fashion 
companies in the future. 
3.5 Societal and environmental effects of outsourcing 
 
As the fashion industry is such a global industry, it affects a lot of different parties as 
well as the environment. In this chapter, some of these societal and environmental 
effects of the global fashion supply chains are briefly discussed – mainly from the same 
perspective as the rest of this study i.e. from the perspective of the fashion companies in 
the more high-cost areas. 
 
The often poor working conditions in the low-cost countries will not be discussed in this 
chapter, as it is a too vast and complex subject that cannot be properly researched within 
the scope of this study. Yet it should be noted, that the many problems concerning these 
low-cost productions sites are a real and important issue as for example the Bangladesh 
factory collapse in 2013 highlights [43; 44]. However, traceability of fashion products 
as well as possibilities of shorter supply chains are both subjects covered in this chapter. 
3.5.1.1 Societal effects and skills within EU 
 
In their study concerning the current state and the future of the European textile, 
clothing and leather (TCL) sector, Vogler-Ludwig and Valente also acknowledged the 
recent decline European TCL-industries caused by heavy price competition and 
increasing globalization among other things. According to them, Europe came up with 
three main strategies in order to tackle these issues and to be able to survive in the 
global markets. These strategies were: 
 
• A cost-oriented approach 
• An innovation-oriented approach 
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• A productivity-oriented approach [27] 
 
The cost-oriented approach’s key feature was to establish production in EU’s more 
low-cost countries (including newest EU member states Romania and Bulgaria) and 
thereby save on labor and energy costs. The innovative approach’s main focus on the 
other hand was developing top quality and innovative specialty textile products. The 
productivity-oriented approach aimed at creating savings by making use of IT and 
automation. In other words, the idea of this strategy was to optimize supply chain 
management and compete with flexible production. [27] 
 
According to Vogler-Ludwig and Valente, these three strategies partly resulted to a 
dichotomy of skills within the EU. A direct result from the outsourcing of production 
into low-cost countries like China for example has of course been the general decline of 
employment in the European as well as in the US clothing sectors (see e.g. Figures in 
Chapter 3.2 for reference). The more value-added activities of the fashion industry’s 
supply chain, such as product development, design and marketing for example, have 
remained in the high-cost areas whereas production is now almost wholly carried out in 
the low-cost areas. Vogler-Ludwig and Valente note however, that not only is this 
dichotomy of skills presented between e.g. Europe and Asia, but it can be observed 
within the EU’s TCL-industries, too. [27] 
 
Vogler-Ludwig and Valente divided the European TCL-industries into high-cost and 
low-cost areas. This division is presented in Table 3.4. Because of the differences in the 
infrastructure and cost structures between these two areas, they both possess different 
attributes that apply to them. According to Vogler-Ludwig’s and Valente’s report, the 
number of TCL-industry’s blue-collar workers declined in the more high-cost areas of 
the EU and increased in the low-cost areas. Respectively the amount of technical and 
business professionals increased in the high-cost areas and decreased in the low-cost 
areas. In practice this implies to disappearance of production activities in the high-cost 
areas and growing financial dependency of the low-cost areas. [27] 
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Table 3.4: European textile, clothing and leather industries divided into high- and low-
cost areas by Vogler-Ludwig and Valente (adapted from [27]). 
High-cost areas Austria Low-cost areas Bulgaria 
Belgium Czech Republic 
Denmark Cyprus 
Finland Estonia 
France Greece 
Germany Lithuania 
Ireland Hungary 
Italy Malta 
Luxembourg Poland 
Netherlands Portugal 
Spain Romania 
Sweden Slovakia 
United Kingdom Slovenia 
 
The cost-oriented approach and the productivity-oriented approach, which both aimed at 
cost savings either through smaller labor and production costs or by utilizing IT and 
automation more effectively, were not enough to stop the decline of EU’s TCL-
industries. Therefore, the innovation-oriented approach, which focuses at making EU 
the top producer and innovator of top quality and specialty textile products, has become 
even more important. This is reflected e.g. in innovation surveys, which tell that the 
European TCL-sector has started to put more emphasis on its research and development 
activities. Especially new and innovative textile appliances were considered a worthy 
alternative for the competitive consumer markets of the more basic textile products. [27]  
 
In terms of fashion industry, all this means a slow disappearance of the low value-added 
activities – mainly production – from EU. The high-cost areas have been able to achieve 
a leading position in the more value-added activities such as fashion design and 
branding for example. At the same time, as the high-cost areas act as managers of the 
supply chains, other kinds of skills and activities including e.g. machinery producers or 
just skilled labor force have been outsourced. As a result, these areas are left with a 
deteriorating skills basis and weakening understanding and experience of clothing 
production. In the future, this could lead to a disappearance of clothing machinery 
producers and training institutions altogether, which in turn would make competing in 
the global fashion markets more difficult. [27] 
 
Although fashion industry’s production activities have predominantly come to an end in 
the high-cost areas of EU, they are still carried out in the low-cost areas. Yet there are 
problems with these areas, too. According to Vogler-Ludwig and Valente, although the 
low-cost areas can offer competitive wages, experienced labor force and close 
proximity to major consumer markets, clothing producers in these areas struggle with 
weak market positioning and a lack of innovative culture and skilled professionals. 
Short-distance transportation is one competitive advantage these low-cost areas could 
 34 
make use of, yet Vogler-Ludwig and Valente argue that without a proper strategy about 
how to improve the TCL-industries in these areas, production activities will continue to 
be relocated elsewhere and EU’s fashion (and other textile) industry base deteriorate. 
[27]. 
3.5.1.2 Societal effects on US 
 
The societal effects of outsourcing of production on the US fashion industry have 
already been highlighted throughout this study. For example: the employment in the US 
clothing manufacturing sector has dropped down by 83 percent from 1990 to 2011 (see 
Figure in 3.7 in Chapter 3.2) [1] due to the cheaper offshore labor costs (see Figure 3.18 
for reference). Therefore, of the top 15 fastest declining occupations in the US, five of 
them (i.e. a little over a third) are related to the textile and clothing industry [45]. This 
goes hand in hand with the fact that 97,5 % of all the clothing products sold in the US in 
2013 were made internationally [35].  
 
 
Figure 3.18: Wages for apparel workers in different countries [46]. 
 
Similarly to EU, the more value-added activities of the fashion industry’s supply chain 
have remained in the US whereas production is almost wholly outsourced. This is also 
reflected in Figure 3.19, which is a bubble chart that presents future projections for 
different fashion-related occupations in the US. On the vertical axis, the change in 
employment of these occupations is presented in percentages. On the horizontal axis, 
the change in employment is presented, but this time in number of employees (i.e. net 
change). The actual size of the bubble presents the projected level of employment in 
2020. [1] 
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Figure 3.19: Employment projections for fashion-related occupations in the US, net 
and percent change in employment, 2010-2020 [1]. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 3.19, the decline of the low value-added, labor intensive 
activities seems to continue in the US. The fashion designers and tailors, dressmakers 
and custom sewers are the only occupations whose employment is not expected to come 
down in the coming years (although it is not expected to grow significantly, either). All 
of this, similarly to EU, suggests to a slow deterioration of the US clothing industry 
base and weakening understanding and experience of clothing manufacture. 
 
According to Davidson, the deteriorating of the U.S. clothing industry is already a 
problem. For example with some companies reshoring back to U.S., the existing small 
contract manufacturers are in trouble because they are unable to handle the increased 
workload and there are not enough skilled sewing machine mechanics, seamstresses or 
managers available. [47] Also, whereas Asian factories are able to handle a product 
order from start to finish in the same facility, the U.S. apparel supply chain is a small 
and complicated network of different specialist contractors, who are shattered across the 
country [46]. 
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3.5.1.3 Fashion industry & the environment 
 
With fashion industry being one of the most global industries today, its environmental 
effects are also significant. These effects are partly a consequence of different aspects 
related to fiber and clothing production in general, partly due to the global nature of the 
industry and partly due to the increasing consumerism in the industry. Also, the 
environmental effects of all the washing and other activities a clothing item goes 
through after it leaves the stores should not be neglected either when talking about the 
ecological aspects of fashion. Yet as this study deals mainly with fashion industry’s 
supply chains, the environmental effects of e.g. cotton or polyester production as well as 
the aforementioned textile care activities exceed its scope. Instead, the environmental 
effects of e.g. fashion industry’s long lead times as well as the cheap clothing prices and 
increasing consumerism are briefly discussed as they more directly related to the study 
subject.  
 
Even a basic product, such as a T-shirt for example, has to travel thousands of miles 
within the fashion industry’s supply chain before making it to the stores. Also, as both 
the rate of purchase as well as disposal have increased significantly over the years, the 
T-shirt’s travel from the store to garbage is now shorter than ever. This situation has 
been brought about with help of globalization, which has enabled fashion companies to 
produce clothing at incredibly low prices. Fashion industry has always been 
characterized by short product lifecycles, low predictability in terms of demand and 
erratic and impulsive consumer behavior [48, see 32, p. 155]. All this has only been 
accentuated and today, many consumers regard fashion as something disposable. Some 
even argue that if clothing prices and quality continue to decline, so too will the demand 
for used clothing as new clothing is sold equally cheap. [49] 
 
Whether or not demand for used clothing will decline, overproduction of clothing is a 
real problem. As already mentioned, it is hard for fashion companies to forecast demand 
especially when purchase decisions are made well before the start of a selling season 
and the production networks are complex and globally dispersed. As a result, 
approximately on third of the fashion companies purchases do not correspond with the 
demand and end up being sold with discounted prices or donated to charity. Not only is 
this bad business for the fashion companies – it is not sustainable for the environment, 
either. When unwanted products are produced, resources from raw materials to energy 
are gratuitously wasted. With better-located production facilities and closer proximity to 
main consumer markets, fashion companies could shorten their lead times and be a lot 
more demand-driven. This would not only benefit the companies in terms of forecast 
errors but it would benefit the environment, too, as less unwanted products would be 
produced and less resources wasted. [5]  
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The problem of overproduction of clothing (as well as the era of growing consumerism 
and disposable fashion) is well highlighted in the following example concerning US’s 
textile and clothing recycling: even though approximately 1,1 billion kg of 
postconsumer textile waste is collected in the US annually, the clothing proportion of it 
only makes up 15 % of all the clothing that is disposed in the US annually. In other 
words, 85 % of US’s clothing waste still ends up directly in landfill. Also, of all the 
clothing donated to charity (included in the 15 %), only about 20 % is sold in the US 
charity shops because there simply is way too much clothing in relation to the demand. 
So, although unwanted clothing can be donated to charity, which is better for the 
environment than simply throwing it into garbage, there still is way too much used 
clothing in the US in spite of the fact that 85 % of it is not even recycled. In Table 3.5, 
the different uses of disposed clothing in US are presented in percentages. [49] 
 
Table 3.5: Uses of disposed clothing in US (in percentages) [based on 49 & 50]. 
 
 
Another factor related to the unnecessary use of resources are the traditional clothing 
samples fashion retailers usually want to see 3 to 12 months before the start of the 
selling season. As the samples are physical and usually sourced offshore, they need to 
be produced well in advance so that the fashion companies as well as the producers 
have enough time to prepare themselves for e.g. advertising and production after the 
samples have been approved. According to Mattila & Mustonen, if fashion companies 
were to take better advantage of the modern 3D-technologies and use 3D-samples 
instead of physical samples, the decisions regarding production could be made a lot 
closer to the start of the selling season. This would reduce the unnecessary waste of 
resources in two ways: firstly by making the production more demand-driven and 
thereby lessening the chance for forecast error and production of unwanted products and 
secondly, by making production of physical samples unnecessary. [5] 
85 
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01 
15 
Dispossed clothing in US annually 
Landfill 
Reused and repurposed 
(majority exported as 
secondhand clothing) 
Recycled and converted 
Recycled into fiber 
Unusable 
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In addition to the overproduction and wasting of resources, another issue related to the 
environmental effects of the global fashion supply chains is the traceability of the 
products. Nearby production does of course not automatically guarantee that products 
are produced in an ecologically and socially responsible manner. Yet it is easier to 
gather this kind of production information from the producers if they have long-term 
partnership with the fashion company and also, if they are located in a neighboring area. 
When a fashion company sources products from various offshore suppliers, they usually 
use a sourcing agent to help with the purchases. With these kinds of long and complex 
supply chains (the supplier could use subcontractors, too) it is considerably more 
difficult to get a proper understanding about the ecological and social aspects of the 
production.  The fact of the matter is that when a supply chain is not transparent, 
changes are that some of its activities might not be very sustainable. [5] 
 
As what comes to the carbon dioxide emissions related to the transportation of fashion 
products across the world: they are actually quite small when compared to overall 
carbon dioxide emissions of a fashion product. For example, only 5 % of the carbon 
dioxide emissions of a t-shirt, that is made from 100 % cotton and transported from 
India to UK via ship, are caused by transportation. [5] It should be noted however, that 
the energy and transportation prices are expected to rise in the future, and the costs of 
climate change are going to affect the global enterprises more and more. [8; 27] 
3.6 Possibilities of shorter supply chains 
Although fashion industry’s supply chains have over the years become more and more 
efficient and different sourcing strategies have been developed, there are still some 
problems with the outsourcing of production and long lead times. For example, 
according to Mattila and, some of the problems for of fashion companies are: 
 
• Approximately one third of the retail trade’s purchases do not correspond 
with the demand. Because of this, products end up being sold with 
significant discounts. 
• A part of the discounted products still do not get sold and need to be 
donated to charity. 
• The products that correspond with the demand are sold quickly but 
cannot be reordered because of invested capital in the yet unsold 
products. Also, because of the long lead times reordered products cannot 
be delivered in the course of the selling season. [5] 
 
As was discussed in the previous chapter dealing with the societal and environmental 
effects of outsourcing, there are also problems when looking from this perspective. The 
purpose of this chapter is therefore, in the light of existing research and statistics, to 
 39 
explore what benefits could be achieved with shorter, more local supply chains and 
production strategies. 
3.6.1 The Kelano-project 
 
The Kelano-project was a project carried out by Tampere University of Technology in 
co-operation with Borås University and funded mainly by Tekes (the Finnish Funding 
Agency for Innovation). Finatex, the Federation of Finnish Textile and Clothing 
Industries, and several fashion companies also took part in the project. The goal of the 
project was to find out concrete ways to make fashion industry’s supply chains both 
more demand-driven as well as sustainable. [5] 
 
The project was divided into six smaller parts that were first, retrieval of information, 
then benchmarking, developing a measuring system, references and finally, solutions 
and publication. Two master’s theses and one bachelor’s thesis for Tampere University 
of Technology were also carried out as a part of the Kelano-project. [5] 
 
A part that is particularly interesting in terms of this study is the benchmarking part of 
the Kelano-project. This is because it contains fairly recent information about several 
fashion companies with different operating methods and analysis about the success 
factors of these companies.  
3.6.1.1 The benchmarking-companies 
 
The benchmarking was carried out mostly by interviewing selected companies. Public 
sources were used to gather information about the companies that were not interviewed 
(H&M, Zara and Patagonia). In addition, all of the companies’ financial statements of 
the year 2008 were analyzed. [5] 
 
The participating companies were from four different categories: Finnish companies, 
Swedish companies, fast fashion (Spanish and Portuguese) companies and slow fashion 
(US and UK) companies (see Table 3.6 for a full list of companies). A report about the 
Swedish companies and master’s theses about both the fast fashion and the slow fashion 
companies were written as a part of the Kelano-project. No individual report was 
written about the Finnish companies though. Therefore, their operations and success 
factors were not analyzed on such a detailed level in the project (and as a result, in this 
study), as was the case with the other participating companies. [5] 
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Table 3.6: A list of the benchmarking-companies in the Kelano-project (adapted from 
[5]). 
Finnish companies Swedish companies 
Citymarket Lindex 
Inex Group Gina Tricot 
Marimekko H&M 
Masi Company Ball Group 
Naisten Pukutehdas Hans K 
Nanso Group SOMconcept 
Orneule   
Texmoda Fashion Group   
Fast fashion (Spanish and Portuguese) 
companies 
Slow Fashion (US and UK) 
companies 
Mango Continental Clothing 
Desigual John Smedley 
Zara Patagonia 
Flor da Moda   
 
Five of the six Swedish companies were clothing companies with the exception of 
Hans K, which is a furniture company specializing in quick deliveries. Of the clothing 
companies SOMconcept is a Swedish microcompany focusing on mass tailoring, Ball 
Group is a Danish (although listed in the Swedish company –category) clothing retail 
store and Lindex, Gina Tricot and H&M are large Swedish clothing retail stores. H&M 
is owned by Hennes & Mauritz AB, which also owns popular Swedish brands COS, 
Monki, Weekday and Cheap Friday and is the one of the world’s largest fashion chains. 
[5] 
 
The fast fashion companies included Mango, Desigual, Zara and Flor da Moda. Fast 
fashion refers to affordable and fashionable clothing products that have been 
manufactured fast. Clothing retail stores use this concept. Their business strategy is to 
have new clothing products enter their stores continuously and fast so that their store 
offering changes repeatedly.  
 
Zara is a Spanish vertical clothing company that is famous for its fast fashion approach. 
It is owned by Industria de Diseño Textil S. A. (or more commonly: Inditex). Desigual 
is a fashion brand that is owned by a Dutch company NTS It’s not the same. Desigual’s 
headquarters are located in Barcelona, Spain. Flor da Moda is a Portuguese fashion 
company that first started out as subcontractor but that later expanded into a fashion 
retail chain with its own brand, Ana Sousa. Mango is after Inditex the second most 
successful Spanish fashion company. [5] 
 
Slow fashion companies are companies that aim at producing long lasting products in a 
responsible manner. There were three companies in the Kelano-project’s slow fashion 
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category: Continental Clothing, John Smedley and Patagonia.  Continental Clothing is a 
British wholesaler of men’s, women’s and children’s cotton clothing. John Smedley is 
also a British company that manufactures luxury knitwear for men and women. 
Patagonia is a brand that is owned by an US company Lost Arrow. The company 
manufactures clothing and accessories for men, women and children. [5] 
 
As noted earlier, no detailed introduction or analysis was conducted about the Finnish 
companies on an individual level. 
3.6.1.2 Company groups 
 
After interviewing and analyzing the benchmarking clothing companies, they were (Ball 
Group, SOMconcept and Finnish companies excluded) redivided into four new 
company groups based on their design and operations approach. These groups were: 
 
• Traditional companies 
• Fast service companies (VMI) 
• Brand builders 
• Fast fashion companies [5] 
 
According to Kelano-project’s final report, traditional companies design mainstream 
products and their acquisition times are long – from six to eighteen months even. Fast 
service companies are companies whose acquisition times are short but who design 
traditional products. These companies take use of vendor-managed inventory (VMI) to 
achieve their fast service. VMI means that a product supplier (usually the manufacturer 
but sometimes also the reseller or distributor) takes care of its buyer’s inventory and 
resupplies it once products are running out [51]. Brand builders design unique 
products that differ from mainstream products, but have traditional acquisition times. 
Fast fashion companies design fashionable products according to the most recent 
trends and their operations are fast. [5] 
 
Of the Kelano-project’s benchmarking companies Mango, Lindex and John Smedley 
were considered traditional companies. Desigual and Patagonia on the other hand were 
brand builders and Continental Clothing and Flor da Moda fast service companies. In 
addition to Zara, Gina Tricot and H&M belonged to the group of fast fashion 
companies. [5] 
 
Table 3.7 is a fourfold table that presents the differences between the four 
aforementioned company groups in terms of their design approach and acquisition 
times. The benchmarking companies have also been marked to their designated 
company groups in the table. 
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Table 3.7: The four company groups for the Kelano-project’s benchmarking companies 
(adapted from [5]). 
  TRADITIONAL DESIGN ENHANCED DESIGN 
SL
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  Traditional companies: 
 
- Mango 
- Lindex 
- John Smedley 
 
Brand builders: 
 
- Desigual 
- Patagonia 
Q
U
IC
K
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  Fast service companies: 
 
- Continental Clothing 
- Flor da Moda 
 
Fast fashion companies: 
 
- GinaTricot 
- Zara 
- H&M 
 
Interestingly, of all the four original fast fashion companies (Mango, Desigual, Zara and 
Flor da Moda), only Zara was considered a true fast fashion company. For example 
Mango, who described itself as a fast fashion company, had according to the 
benchmarking interviews traditional supply chains and long lead times which rather 
made it a traditional, slow response company. Desigual on the other hand had more 
enhanced design than Mango, but equally traditional supply chains and Flor da Moda’s 
service was fast, but design quite traditional. So, actually only Zara fulfilled the 
requirements of a fast fashion company: it had both fashionable design and fast lead 
times. [5] 
3.6.1.3 Key figures 
 
As noted earlier, the benchmarking companies’ financial statements of the year 2008 
were also analyzed as a part of the Kelano-project. For the companies that were 
redivided into the four aforementioned company groups, certain key figures where 
calculated from the statements. The purpose of the key figures was to help recognize 
success factors that concern global fashion companies.  These key figures with short 
explanations are listed below: 
 
• Gross margin: Calculated by subtracting the acquisition costs of products sold 
from the actual sales. One measure used for profitability. 
• Net profit: Another measure for profitability. The profit that remains after all 
costs have been subtracted. 
• Growth: In the Kelano-project, growth referred to the scale of operation of the 
benchmarking companies. How much a company has debt in respect of assets 
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(i.e. what is the solidity of the company) affects its intentions to expand its 
business and grow in the long run.  
• Stockturn: A measure of efficiency. Tells how quickly a company’s inventory 
is renewed – or in other words: how often a company’s inventory is fully sold in 
the course of one year. 
• Debt to Assets: A measure of solidity, which means how well a company can 
meet its financial obligations in the long run. Tells how much a company has 
debt in respect of assets. 
• Current ratio: A measure of liquidity. Is calculated by dividing short-term 
assets with short-term debts. 
• Cash turnover: A measure of efficiency. Tells how well a company utilizes its 
short-term assets.  
• Actual mark-up: Mark-up is another term for the contribution margin of a 
product. It is added to the selling price of a product to be able to cover operating 
costs and generate profits. Actual mark-up is not always the mark-up the 
company desires. Actual mark-up is calculated by dividing the company’s sales 
with its purchases. 
• GMROI: Stands for gross margin return on investment. Another measure for 
profitability – or more precisely, profitability of inventory. Tells what kind of 
gross margin return is generated with capital invested in the inventory. [5] 
3.6.1.4 Results  
 
According to the key figures calculated in the Kelano-project, companies from the fast 
fashion and brand builder –company groups have been the most successful ones during 
the past ten years.  They, for example, had the highest actual mark-ups. Fast fashion 
companies have fashionable design according to the latest trends and brand builders on 
the other hand manufacture products that are unique and differ from the mainstream. 
Therefore, they were able to attain high actual mark-ups. Fast fashion companies also 
had the best results in the net profit percentage (before taxes), GMROI and cash 
turnover (see Table 3.8). According to the Kelano-project, the success of the fast 
fashion companies was due to their good understanding of consumers’ needs and the 
fact that they were able, thanks to their fast supply chains and distribution channels, to 
also meet those needs. [5] 
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Table 3.8: Key figure results for the Kelano-project’s company groups (adapted from 
[5]). 
TRADITIONAL DESIGN ENHANCED DESIGN
Year: 2008 Traditional companies Brand builders
Gross margin [%] 43,39% 57,63%
Net profit (before taxes) [%] 4,18% 9,22%
Growth (2005-9) [%] 5,01% 316,52%
Stock turn 2,15 2,37
Debt to Assets 0,70 0,44
Current ratio 0,41 0,5
Cash turnover 1,09 1,89
Actual mark-up 1,94 2,36
GMROI 2,01 3,23
Year: 2008 Fast service companies Fast fashion companies
Gross margin [%] 30,55% 59,01%
Net profit (before taxes) [%] 4,56% 12,58%
Growth (2005-9) [%] -0,11% 144,33%
Stock turn 2,78 4,15
Debt to Assets 0,42 0,35
Current ratio 0,43 0,52
Cash turnover 1,62 2,83
Actual mark-up 1,44 2,44
GMROI 1,22 5,97
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Fast service companies have traditional design, but their service is fast due to vendor-
managed inventory. Therefore, it was reasonable to assume that the fast service 
companies would have the best results in stock turn. Yet this was not the case – the fast 
fashion companies actually had the best stock turn (4,15). In the Kelano-project’s final 
report, this was contributed to the fact that in the case of the fast fashion companies, 
stock mainly refers to finished products at stores where as with fast service companies, 
stock entails raw material, components and finished products both in storage and in 
stores. Traditional companies on the other hand had the slowest stock turn (2,15), which 
was quite expected, as these companies have long lead times throughout their whole 
supply chain. [5] 
 
As noted above, the key to the success of the fast fashion companies is the fact that they 
are extremely demand-driven. That, again, is achieved through their very effective 
supply chain management and short supply chains. For example, according to the 
Kelano-project, 50 % of Zara’s products are manufactured in its own production 
facilities in Spain. And as for the rest: 26 % of the remaining products are acquired from 
elsewhere of Europe and only 24 % from Asia. This kind of production network makes 
it possible for Zara to acquire its most fashionable products (which make up 
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approximately 75 % of all its products) during – not before – the ongoing selling 
season. Gina Tricot also acquires the majority of its products from Europe: 50 % of 
Gina Tricot’s products are from Europe, 38 % from China and 12 % from India. 
H&M’s is the only company of the three who acquires majority of its products from 
outside of Europe: 60 % of its products are from Asia and less than 40 % from Europe. 
Yet, according to the Kelano-project, they are extremely price conscious and excel at 
supply chain management and are therefore able to achieve good results. [5] 
 
Although in terms of the whole fashion industry, the Kelano-project covered only a 
small part of it. Still, the participating companies presented a good sampling of various 
fashion companies with different operating methods from traditional supply chain 
management to true fast fashion companies. The results offer interesting details about 
the success factors of fashion companies. According to the Kelano-project, it seems that 
fashion companies could by adapting more quicker and shorter supply chains better 
their profitability – even though purchases closer to the start of the selling season were 
considerably more expensive. With more demand-driven and shorter supply chains, the 
companies could have better chances of forecasting the demand correctly and thereby 
decrease their need for discount sales and on the other hand, effectively provide 
customers replenishments of the most popular products. According to the project, 
purchase decisions should be made as near the selling season as possible for example by 
utilizing 3D-samples instead of physical samples. Also, unnecessary processes in the 
supply chain that do not add any value for the end consumer should be tried to get rid 
of. It is suggested in the Kelano-project’s final report that the costs of inefficient supply 
chain and inventory management are actually enormous and over 25 % of companies’ 
purchases end up being sold with discounted prices. [5] 
3.6.2 H. Mattila: Merchandising Strategies and Retail Performance for 
Seasonal Fashion Products  
 
“Merchandising Strategies and Retail Performance for Seasonal Fashion Products” is a 
dissertation carried out by Heikki Mattila for the Lappeenranta University of 
Technology. It studies the effects of different apparel merchandising strategies on retail 
performance, and focuses especially on the retailer’s profitability and success. The 
object of the dissertation was to come up with estimates for selected performance 
measures, which could then be used to help select a suitable merchandising strategy for 
seasonal fashion products. [6] 
 
The dissertation consisted of three parts that were first, a theoretical study, then an 
empirical research with case studies and lastly, based on the aforementioned two parts, a 
model for selecting successful merchandising strategies. [6] 
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3.6.2.1 Sourcing strategy trade-offs 
 
When selecting a sourcing strategy, retailer has to choose whether they want to engage 
in an offshore or local sourcing strategy. This is related to whether the retailer wishes to 
use up-front or replenishment buying. [6] 
 
Offshore sourcing strategy means that a retailer sources its products offshore from 
countries with low labor costs. Local sourcing strategy then again refers to producers 
with a closer proximity to the retailer but with higher purchase prices. Depending on 
which sourcing strategy the retailer chooses to use, different buying strategies apply. 
Up-front buying means that retailer buys its products before the start of a selling season. 
Replenishment buying on the other hand means that product replenishments can be 
made during a selling season, too. [6] 
 
There are advantages and disadvantages related to both of these sourcing strategies. For 
example: although a retailer might benefit from the low labor costs related to an 
offshore sourcing strategy, due to the long lead times of this sourcing strategy 
replenishment buying is not possible unless expensive air freight is used. Then again 
local sourcing strategy enables replenishment buying but at the same time increases the 
purchase prices. [6] 
 
In order to balance out the advantages and disadvantages of these strategies, it is not 
uncommon for retailers to engage themselves in both of the aforementioned sourcing 
strategies simultaneously. This results in e.g. Quick Response (QR) and Vendor-
Managed Inventory (VMI) –strategies. The QR-strategy is a combination of both 
upfront and replenishment buying meaning that the retailer sources some of its products 
offshore before the start of the selling season and some as replenishments from more 
local producers during the selling season. The use of point-of-sale (POS) information 
is a vital element of the QR-strategy. POS information means electronically recorded 
information about actual sales, and it is a great tool for making more accurate 
forecasting and inventory decisions. The VMI-strategy then again refers to a strategy 
where the product supplier manages the retailer’s inventory. The actual purchase 
decisions as well as the products are made in advance, before the start of the selling 
season. Yet with this strategy, only some of them are first delivered to the retailer’s 
stores and then later, for example once a week, the retailer places replenishment orders 
based on POS information. The POS information however is not shared with the 
product supplier, who simply delivers the ordered products from the ready-made 
inventory. [6] 
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3.6.2.2 Critical success factors related to sourcing strategies 
 
Mattila identified four critical success factors related to the sourcing of seasonal fashion 
products. Those success factors were: 
 
• Forecast accuracy 
• Process lead time 
• Offshore / local sourcing mix 
• Up-front / replenishment buying mix [6] 
 
Forecast accuracy means how well a retailer has been able to estimate future demand. 
Process lead time refers to the time it takes for a product supplier to deliver a product 
once a retailer has placed an order for it. Offshore / local sourcing mix means the 
relation in which a retailer uses these sourcing strategies and related to that, up-front / 
replenishment buying mix mean the relation in which a retailer uses these buying 
strategies. All of these critical success factors are closely tied to one another. For 
example, the shorter the process lead times, the better the forecast accuracy. The lead 
times then again are related to the sourcing mix used by the retailer, and the sourcing 
mix defines which buying mix to use. [6] 
3.6.2.3 Success measures for retail success 
 
In the dissertation, it was necessary to define certain success measures in order to be 
able to evaluate the retail success. These success measures were: 
 
• Service level 
• Lost sales 
• Product substitute percentage 
• Gross margin 
• Stock turn 
• GMROI-R 
• Mark-down rate [6] 
 
Service level means how well products are available in stores in relation to demand. 
Lost sales result from unsatisfactory service level, when wanted products are not 
available (or e.g. if they are too expensive). Product substitute percentage tells how 
many consumers that didn’t find the product they were looking for end up buying a 
substituting product. Gross margin is the margin that results from subtracting the 
acquisition costs of products sold from the actual sales. Stock turn tells how often a 
retailers’s inventory is renewed within the course of one year. GMROI stands for gross 
margin return on investment and it tells how well merchandising inventories manage to 
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generate profit. GMROI is calculated by dividing gross margin with average inventory. 
The average inventory can be used at either cost value or at retail value. When 
inventory at retail value is used, the calculated GMROI is called GMROI-R. Mark-
down rate is the percentage of all the products that end up being sold with discounted 
prices. [6] 
3.6.2.4 Successful sourcing strategies 
 
After analyzing the success measures resulting from different variations of the critical 
success factors related to the sourcing strategies, successful sourcing strategies were 
identified. According to the dissertation, up-front buying together with replenishments 
was considered to be more profitable for the retailer than up-front buying solely. When 
a retailer engages in either a GR- or a VMI-strategy, better retail performance can be 
expected when compared to a traditional offshore sourcing strategy, given the fact that 
purchase prices are less than 40 % higher with the QR-strategy and less than 23 % 
higher with the VMI-strategy. Of offshore, QR- and VMI-strategies, the QR-strategy 
was considered the most successful one if POS information was shared with the retailer 
and the product supplier. This is because with a QR-strategy and shared POS 
information, production decisions can be made based on actual demand instead of 
forecasts, yielding in improved forecast accuracy. In general, reducing lead times 
between the forecasts and the start of a selling season resulted in better profitability. 
Only in a case where the number of replenishments was very limited, the traditional 
offshore sourcing strategy was considered to be more profitable than an offshore / 
replenishment mix.  [6] 
3.7 Future scenarios for EU’s and US’ fashion industries 
There have been different scenarios for both EU’s and US’s fashion industry’s future as 
well as the future of clothing and textile industry in these areas in general. In this 
chapter, some of these scenarios are highlighted and especially the aspects regarding the 
future of the fashion industries are discussed. 
3.7.1 Future scenarios for EU’s TCL-industries 
 
Vogler-Ludwig and Valente, whose research has already been referenced throughout 
this study, studied the current state and the future of the European textile, clothing and 
leather product sector in 2009. The study was a commissioned by the PROGRESS 
program, which was a European Commission program that took place between 2007 
and 2013. The main goal of the program was to improve e.g. employment and social 
solidarity within Europe.  As a part of their research, Vogler-Ludwig and Valente came 
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up with three alternative future scenarios for the EU’s TLC industries. [27; 52] These 
scenarios were:  
 
• Globalization limited 
• Asian dominance – European excellence 
• Advanced New Member States [27] 
 
The Globalization limited is en ecological scenario, which main focus is on 
transforming the European TCL-sector into a self-sufficient sector that is no longer as 
dependent on international trade. Instead, it creates competitive advantage with 
environmentally friendly production methods that entail e.g. proper emission control, 
energy efficiency, specialized small-scale production and sustainable products. The 
Asian dominance – European excellence –scenario then again is a technological 
scenario that aims at turning EU’s TCL-sector into high-tech sector with innovative and 
technically advanced specialty textiles. This scenario will lead to deindustrialization of 
the TCL-sector and create jobs for e.g. technical and marketing specialists and natural 
scientists. The Advanced New Member State –scenario is a “jobs first” –scenario. It 
aims at defending EU’s industrial base by creating an independent TCL-industry in 
EU’s low-cost areas. This scenario is based on market and quality oriented management 
and requires proper cost and quality control as well as efficient production. [27] 
 
The differences between these scenarios and their main focuses are presented in Figure 
3.20 and their main competences in Table 3.9. 
 
 
Figure 3.20: Three future scenarios for EU’s TCL-industries [27]. 
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Table 3.9: Main competences of the three future scenarios [27]. 
 
 
As for the three scenarios, the Asian dominance – European excellence –scenario is 
currently the one Europe seems to be heading at, because it has been outsourcing its 
production activities more and more and paying more emphasis on product 
development, brand management and marketing. [27] Yet in terms of this study and its 
focus on fashion industry and possibilities of shorter supply chains, the Advanced New 
Member State –scenario is the most interesting one.  
 
In order to work, all of the three scenarios require adequate courses of action. 
According to Vogler-Ludwig and Valente, the Advanced New Member State –scenario 
is very ambitious, as it calls for both very efficient as well as flexible mass-production 
that is carried out at low costs. Therefore, it requires e.g. strong investments into 
vocational training in the fields of engineering, business administration, management, 
marketing and design. Crafts-related vocational training should be revived, too. 
Industrial policies that strengthen EU’s regional clusters and help promote business 
foundation and process innovation, design and marketing are equally necessary. Also, 
intellectual property should be properly protected. The production networks in this 
scenario should better their competitiveness by taking advantage of high product 
specialization, which would lead to economies of scale with greater efficiency. Clothing 
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companies for their part should try to come up with their own competitive brands and 
independent marketing channels. [27] 
 
There are some problems with all of the three scenarios, too. For example: as the 
Advanced New Member State –scenario is a “jobs first” –scenario that needs very cost 
efficient and flexible production networks in order to work, its focus on different 
environmental factors is not as good as e.g. the Globalization limited –scenario’s. 
Vogler-Ludwig and Valente also estimate, that all of the three scenarios will result in 
job losses in the EU’s TLC-sector. However, whereas the Asian dominance – European 
excellence –scenario is expected to cause a 50 % drop in the TCL-industry’s 
employment by 2020, the other two scenarios are only expected to drop the employment 
by 20-25 %. Then again, these two scenarios are also expected to slow down the overall 
growth of the TCL-sector. The Advanced New Member State –scenario for example 
aims at engaging in low value-added activities and therefore, relies on low wages. [27] 
 
It is clear that all of these scenarios cannot exist at the same time and therefore, 
Europe’s TCL-industries need to decide whether to they want to engage in a 
deindustrialized economy or try to protect their industrial base. At the moment it seems 
that the Asian dominance – European excellence –scenario seems to be gaining more 
popularity. The Advanced New Member State –scenario could bring fashion industry’s 
production activities back to EU on a bigger scale, yet it entails a lot of challenges and 
requires a complete reorganization of fashion industry’s production networks. Vogler-
Ludwig and Valente note however, that the rising costs of climate change and the 
ecological aspects of global supply chains together with the problems related to the 
dichotomy of skills between high- and low-cost areas might end up increasing the 
appeal of the other two strategies. [27] 
3.7.2 Future of US fashion industry 
 
There have also been different scenarios regarding US fashion industry’s future. For 
example, Eundeok Kim and Kim KP Johnson released two articles about forecasting the 
future for US fashion industry’s different sectors in the Journal of Fashion Marketing 
and Management in 2009. The articles were carried out by examining the opinions of 
different professionals working in the US fashion field. 
 
According to the articles, developments in technology are going to mold the industry in 
the future. Yet instead of trying to bring production activities back to the United States, 
technology was considered to be a valuable tool in making the fashion supply chains 
more integrated and quicker. Overall, US’s fashion industry’s future was seen as more 
consumer-driven and collaborative, combining different nations and resulting in a more 
efficient production. [53; 54] 
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Another factor that is, according to the articles, going to get even more important is the 
individualization of consumers and mass-customization. In the future, consumers might 
expect a lot more personalized shopping experience. What this means for the retailers is 
that they will have to be able to provide the consumers with more than just products 
they like. Instead, consumers are expected to take a more active role in the whole design 
process. This was considered possible with help of technologically advanced design 
softwares like body scanning and other 3D-technologies for example. [53; 54] 
 
With the mass-customization, the roles of the different actors within the US fashion 
industry from consumers, designers and retailers to producers are expected to change. 
For example, the need for technical designers will increase whereas creative design 
activities are expected to move offshore. Also, retailers have to come up with new ways 
to incorporate consumers in the design process on which the selling associates need to 
be educated. One thing that is not going to change however is the importance of speed-
to-market. On the contrary, fashion companies will have to serve the consumers even 
quicker, which of course puts the companies under a lot of pressure. Whether or not the 
technological advances in the supply chain management as well as product design will 
be enough to make US fashion industry competitive in the global markets and guarantee 
the required speed-to-market remains to be seen. [53; 54] 
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4 CASE STUDIES 
The point of this chapter is to study on a more practical level how companies, who 
wholly or partly prefer shorter supply chains and more local producers, have arranged 
their production related operations and how they have succeeded in the fashion market. 
As this study is conducted as a literature review, a key criterion upon selecting the case 
companies was that enough data was available about the selected companies. This of 
course limited the number of companies suitable for this study. In the end, Zara and 
American Apparel where considered good choices for this study, and the following 
chapters will analyze the operations of both of these companies in more detail.  
4.1 Zara 
Zara is a Spanish clothing company that is known for its fast fashion approach. It is 
owned by Industria de Diseño Textil S. A. (or more commonly: Inditex), which is also a 
Spanish company and the largest fashion retailer in the world. [55] Inditex owns 
altogether 8 different fashion brands of which Zara as well as Zara Home are two. The 
other brands are Pull&Bear, Bershka, Stradivarius, Oysho, Massimo Dutti and Uterqüe 
(see Figure 4.1) [56]. However, Zara is the first and largest of Inditex’s brands and 
contributes for 64 % of Inditex’s sales [57]. All of the Inditex’s brands follow a fast 
fashion approach meaning they offer fashionable items that are affordable and 
manufactured fast. However, their operations are otherwise separated from each other, 
and each of them have e.g. their own ordering, warehousing and distribution systems. 
[58, p. 62-63] 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Inditex’s eight brands and their logos [56]. 
 
Zara’s headquarters are located in La Coruña, which is a town on the northern coast of 
Spain (see Figure 4.2). In addition to Zara, it also hosts e.g. the headquarters of Inditex. 
All Zara’s distribution as well as a big part of its manufacturing are executed in La 
Coruña, too. Altogether Zara employs over 120 000 people (2013), has over 2000 stores 
in 88 countries worldwide and contributed net sales worth of 11 594 million euros in the 
year 2014. [57; 59; 60]  
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Figure 4.2: Location of La Coruña in Spain [61]. 
4.1.1 Company history  
 
Zara as well as Inditex were founded by Amancia Ortega Gaona. He was born in 1936 
in Spain and worked for several different clothing retailers before starting his own 
business in 1963. According to Crofton and Dopico, due to his experiences with the 
different retailers, Ortega came to the conclusion that if costs are properly controlled 
and also cut during different stages of fashion industry’s activities, better profitability 
can be expected. In 1963, he then set up his own dress making business, Confessiones 
Goa, which was a vertically integrated clothing company combining both clothing 
design and manufacturing activities. However, the company was not directly involved 
in retailing but sold its products to wholesalers, small retailers as well as department 
stores, who then sold the products to the final consumers. When the company first 
started, it employed around 125 people but within its first ten years of business, it 
quickly evolved into a 380 person successful company. [62; 63] 
 
In 1975, the first Zara-store was opened in La Coruña, Spain. The store enabled Ortega 
to sell his company’s products directly to the final consumers. From the very beginning, 
Zara’s approach to fashion was to offer customers fashionable clothing with affordable 
prices. This approach was well received within the public and Zara’s success grew, 
which led the previously family-run company to turn into an even more professional 
business with adequate managers. However, Ortega continued to take an active part in 
the company management as well as clothing and store design. Along with the success, 
Zara was able to expand its business to a more national level and nine new stores 
around Spain were opened between 1976-1983, as well as two garment factories and a 
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logistics center in Arteixo, a town near La Coruña. During this time, Ortega focused on 
the vertical integration of the company and as a result, Inditex was created to work as a 
holding company for all the different subsidiaries related to the company. In 1983-1984, 
Inditex started using co-operatives and workshops for its sewing activities and in 1986-
1987, Inditex’s manufacturing subsidiaries no longer sold their products to any other 
retailers than the ones owned by Inditex. [62; 63] 
 
Zara’s international expansion started in 1988 when it opened its first store outside of 
Spain in Porto, Portugal. After that, stores were opened e.g. in 1989 in the US and in 
1990 in France. In the following years, new stores would constantly be opened and 
other brands would be added to the Inditex, too. As already mentioned, today Zara has 
over 2000 stores in 88 different countries worldwide. The more recent developments of 
Zara include for example its holding company, Inditex, turning into a publicly traded 
company in 2001 with an initial public offering of 26 % of the company’s shares [62, p. 
47], and the opening of Zara’s online-store in September 2010.  [63] 
4.1.2 Business characteristics 
 
According to Ferdows, Lewis, Machuca and Laurent, Zara was first founded to work as 
an outlet for a big order that had already been manufactured but that the original 
customer had cancelled. Yet very soon after launching of the first store, the company 
took note of the advantages of having manufacturing and retailing activities closely tied 
to one another, and it has been one of Zara’s key success factors ever since. [58, p. 62] 
The results of branching into retailing inspired Ortega to start working on the vertical 
integration of the company, and it was also during that time he came up with his 
groundbreaking policies of making fashion accessible to everyone by offering 
consumers fashionable clothing items at affordable prices. [62] 
 
So, from the very early stages of Zara, the company has always identified itself as a 
retailer of fashionable and economical clothing items [64, p. 7]. Inditex, Zara’s holding 
company, defines its objectives as to offer consumers “creativity and quality design 
together with a rapid response to market demands” and also, to “democratize fashion” 
[62, p. 42]. In order to achieve these objectives, Zara has to offer its consumers new and 
constantly changing products all throughout the year. As the products change quickly, 
majority of them are usually produced in small amounts. Even if a product becomes 
very popular, Zara is not going to reproduce it. [65] Also, as a part of its strategy and 
related to the scarcity of the products, Zara tends to hold minimal inventory. All this 
means that if a consumer finds something they like and want in a Zara store, it would be 
a good idea for them to buy the desired product straight away because it might me sold 
out – or moved elsewhere – the next time they visit the store. After two or three weeks, 
if a product in Zara’s store remains unsold, it is either shipped to another store in the 
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same country or back to Zara’s facilities in Spain. As a result, for example in central 
London, consumers have been found to visit an average clothing store four times a year 
whereas Zara stores are visited approximately 17 times a year. Another result of Zara’s 
low inventory strategy is that Zara has, compared to other fashion retailers, less unsold 
products that need to be discounted (less than 10 % whereas the industry average is 
between 17 and 20 %) and manages to get 85 % of the full price on its products (again, 
industry average between 60 and 70 %).  [58; 66; 67] 
 
Another thing that is distinctive for Zara is that they do not advertise. Zara’s only uses 
0,3 percent of its sales on advertising while the average for its competitors is about 3 to 
4 percent [66]. This is because, according to Inditex’s chief communications officer, the 
products at the stores change so quickly that e.g. magazines and other media cannot 
keep up with the pace [59]. Also, as the Zara stores are visited more frequently than the 
average store, it creates positive buzz and word-of-mouth for Zara thereby eliminating 
the need for big advertising campaigns [58, p. 63]. 
 
Zara’s business strategy has generated a lot of success for the company. Because of this, 
it has also understandably stayed the same throughout the years – the company still 
focuses on offering consumers affordable and fashionable items according to the latest 
trends – although ecological aspects seem to have gained more attention in Zara’s 
operations, too. For example, on Inditex’s corporate homepage, the company declares 
that: “Zara is always striving to meet the needs of its customers at the same time as 
helping to inform their ideas, trends and tastes. The idea is to share responsible passion 
for fashion across a broad spectrum of people, cultures and ages.” [60] Further on 
Zara’s own homepage, Zara’s mission statement is defined as: “Through Zara’s 
business model, we aim to contribute to the sustainable development of society and that 
of the environment with which we interact.” [68] 
 
It is certain however, that to be able to manage a business strategy with constantly 
changing, economical products, Zara has to have a strong hold of the different actors 
within its supply chain [58, p. 65]. How the company has actually organized its 
operations and made their approach on fashion retailing possible in practice will be 
discussed in a following chapter concerning Zara’s key operational features. 
4.1.3 Products 
 
Zara’s product range consists of lines for women’s, men’s as well as children’s wear 
(see Figure 4.3). Accessories such as shoes, bags and makeup for example, can also be 
purchased from Zara’s stores. [64, p. 10 & p. 12] However, the women’s wear line is 
the biggest part of Zara’s operations, making up about 60 % of Zara’s total sales [58, p. 
63].  
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Figure 4.3: Zara’s Autumn Winter 2015 Campaign –pictures [69]. 
 
As for the designing of the three product lines: instead of only using groups of 
designers, Zara has assigned a creative team consisting of designers and sourcing- and 
product development specialists for each of the product lines. The different members 
within one team then work together on a number of different products, using popular 
products that have sold well as a foundation and reference. The teams have also been 
advised to e.g. restrict the number of changes they make to a product prototype so that 
the development process and speed to market are as quick as possible. [70, p. 2] 
 
As a result, Zara launches new products considerably more often than an average 
fashion retailer. According to Ferdows, Lewis and Machuca, Zara’s designers come up 
with 40 000 new designs per year, from which about one quarter, i.e. 10 000, end up 
being produced (whereas according to Ghemawat, Nueno and Daily, the corresponding 
number of new designs per year for Zara’s competitors is between 2000-4000 [64, p. 
9]). In addition, most of the selected designs come in different colors and sizes meaning 
Zara has to manage approximately 300 000 new stock-keeping units (SKUs) annually. 
[66] This is all part of Zara’s strategy: although Zara, like many other fashion retailers, 
does present final consumers new clothing collections every season, in Zara’s case these 
collections only make up around 39 percent of their total sales. The rest of the sales (i.e. 
a remarkable 61 percent) are made with products that are produced during the ongoing 
season. In practice this means that Zara has new products enter their stores as often as 
every two weeks instead of every twelve weeks, which is the case with many other 
fashion retailers. [62, p. 44] 
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4.1.4 Key operational features 
 
Zara and its exceptional take on fashion retailing has been studied in many different 
researches. In this chapter, that existing research is looked into in order to get an 
understanding of how Zara has put its operations in action and what the reasons behind 
its success are. As the topic of this thesis is to ponder the possibilities of shorter supply 
chains, that is also the main focus and point of view of this chapter. 
 
It should be noted, too, that although Zara’s key operational features have been divided 
into their own, individual categories within this chapter, these categories are closely 
related to each other and together, make Zara’s success possible.  
4.1.4.1 Vertical integration 
 
Zara is popular for its fast fashion approach. As already discussed in the previous 
chapter, Zara manages to offer consumers new products as often as every two weeks, 
which means that the company produces about 10 000 new products – or, when 
different sizes and colors are taken into account, about 300 000 new stock-keeping units 
– every year. [62; 66] To be able to carry out production of that many products that 
quickly, Zara has to have a strong control over its entire supply chain [58, p. 65]. In 
Zara’s case, this is executed with help of vertical integration. 
 
Vertical integration means that the retailer has not outsourced its production but also 
owns a part or all of the companies within its own supply chain [4, p. 18]. As for 
fashion firms, vertical integration is quite rare. Many companies have e.g. kept hold of 
their design and sales related activities, but outsourced the actual manufacturing in order 
to save on labor costs and because of other reasons covered more thoroughly in Chapter 
3: Overview of fashion industry’s production networks. Yet Zara has chosen a different 
approach: ever since the beginning, it has focused on the vertical integration of the 
company and to this day, carries out a big part of its production in its own factories. 
[62] 
 
In Zara’s case, the company has decided to carry out the more capital-intensive 
production activities, that add more value to the product, itself. These activities include 
for example acquiring of raw materials, designing of the products, cutting, dyeing, 
quality control, distribution, logistics etc. The more labor-intensive activities that add 
less value to the products are then again outsourced. Sewing is an example of an activity 
that Zara has outsourced.  [62, p. 43] 
 
What all this means in practice is that Zara has a diverse network of both raw material 
and fabric suppliers from for example China, Turkey and Italy among others. After the 
acquisition, the materials are usually delivered to Inditex’s subsidiaries, where they are 
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then processed (meaning e.g. dyed, printed and cut). [62, p. 43] In Arteixo, a town near 
La Coruña where the first Zara-store was opened, there are 11 factories that Inditex 
owns and that process products for Zara [65]. Then, the fabrics are further delivered to 
different sewing co-operatives and workshops, where they are sewn according to Zara’s 
requirements. The network of these sewing workshops covers more than four hundred 
workshops, and they are mainly located near La Coruña or in Northern Portugal. 
Finally, after the sewing, ready products are delivered back to the Inditex’s subsidiaries, 
where they undergo quality control, finishing and packaging for example. [62, p. 43] 
 
Zara’s distribution and retail sales are also carried out by Inditex’s subsidiaries. After 
the products are ready and packed, they are sent to Inditex’s distribution center in 
Arteixo, from where they are finally shipped with help of an outsourced delivery service 
[64, p. 12] to Zara’s stores around the world. As for the stores: the majority (89%) of 
Zara’s stores are managed by the company itself. In a case where the store is located in 
a country with major cultural and/or legal business differences, franchises are used. It 
should be noted, however, that these franchises use e.g. the same ordering mechanisms 
as the company-managed Zara stores and are overall tightly linked to the company. [62, 
p. 43; 65] 
 
Also, unlike many other companies, Zara has chosen to keep its three product lines 
(men’, women’s and children’s wear) as their own operationally distinct units. This 
means that each product line has, as was mentioned earlier, been assigned with their 
own creative team consisting of designers, sourcing- and product development 
specialist. Respectively, each product line also has e.g. their own sales, market specialist 
and production-planning staffs as well as their own hall in Zara’s centralized design and 
production center, which is attached to holding-company Inditex’s headquarters in La 
Coruña. Although it is more expensive for Zara to operate its three product lines 
separately (which is why many fashion retailers handle their product lines as one single 
entity), the supply chain for each of the product lines is, as a result of this, a lot more 
responsive and faster. [71] 
 
So, of Zara’s overall production, about 50 % is carried out by Zara itself in Spain and 
the rest is then carried out by subcontractors. Of these subcontractors, about 26 % are 
from Europe and the remaining 24 % from Asia. [5] The production in Europe is 
approximately 15 to 20 % more expensive for Zara when compared to production in 
Asia. Therefore, the more basic products are usually the type of products that are 
produced in Asia, as they are not as time-sensitive as the more fashionable products. 
The more fashionable products are then again the type of products that are produced in 
Europe. [64, p. 11]  
 
By having a strong hold of its whole supply chain, keeping its own factories, 
distribution centers and retail stores and preferring European subcontractors, Zara has 
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managed to achieve very short lead times: the lead time for a completely new product 
is, at its fastest, four weeks and for a product that is modified of an old product, two 
weeks. Therefore, Zara is able to make production decisions for 50 % of its products 
during and not before a selling season. Only basic products (about 20 %), because they 
are usually manufactured in Asia, are ordered half a year before the start of the season, 
30 % just before the selling season and the majority, 50 %, not until during the selling 
season. [5] For comparison: the industry average for this kind of “in-season 
commitments” (meaning production during the selling season) varies from 0 % to a 
maximum of 20 % depending on the retailer (see Figure 4.4 for reference) [58, p.65]. 
Yet this way, Zara has been able to lessen its chances for forecast errors and oversupply 
of products, as orders are based on actual demand during the season.  
Figure 4.4: Pre- and in-season commitmens: Zara vs. traditional industry [64]. 
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4.1.4.2 Centralized distribution 
 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, Inditex has its own distribution center in 
Arteixo. This means that even if a Zara’s product in question was only a basic product 
that was manufactured in China by Zara’s Chinese subcontractors, it will still have to be 
sent to the distribution center in Spain before it ends up in a Zara-store somewhere in 
the world. This might seem like an odd arrangement but it has actually been one of 
Zara’s key factors in making its supply chain as efficient as it is. [65] 
 
The Arteixo-based distribution center is approximately 470 000 square meters big and it 
is operated on dual-shifts. [64, p. 11; 67] All of the Inditex-owned Zara’s factories are 
linked to the distribution center via tunnels or a ceiling rails network that all in all 
covers about 200 kilometers (see Figure 4.5 for reference) [65]. As the distribution 
center holds a massive amount of Zara’s products (approximately 50 000 products per 
week from each factory [65]), there is a mobile tracking system for the products. The 
system is able to assign products into their suitable areas in the distribution center with 
help of barcodes, and it can handle about 45 000 products per hour. [64, p. 11] 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Ready items in Zara’s facility [72]. 
 
Ghemawat, Nueno and Dailey however note, that the majority of the products in the 
distribution center stay there only for some hours and never more than three days. The 
shipments from the distribution center are also done in a graduated manner based on 
different time zones: shipments to America, Middle East and Asia are carried out early 
in the morning and shipments to Europe are handled later in the day. [64, p. 12] 
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Zara’s stores place orders directly to the distribution center via handheld computers. 
Usually there are new orders twice every week, but during a peak of a sales season, 
even as often as three times a week. In the distribution center, these orders are handled, 
and based on e.g. the availability of the products and previous sales history, allocation 
decisions are then made accordingly. If an order ends up being approved, products are 
delivered to the stores with help of an outsourced delivery service. Products going to 
stores in Europe (about 75 % of all products) are transported via truck and products 
going outside of Europe (the remaining 25 % of the products) are transported via plane. 
The delivery to Europe takes approximately 24 to 36 hours, and to outside of Europe 
approximately 24 to 48 hours [64, p. 12]. 
 
With help of the vertically integrated, centralized distribution center, Zara is able to 
keep proper track of all of its products. Also, as the products in the distribution center 
have already been tagged and packed and as the stores are able to place orders directly 
to the distribution center, Zara is able to react to the orders quickly and effectively. As a 
result, stores do not need separate storage spaces for products but the products can be 
directly placed on the shelves.  
4.1.4.3 IT tools 	
Because of the pace and the amount of products that Zara produces, the company also 
has to have adequate IT tools to be to able to keep track all their different stock-keeping 
units. The fact that Zara’s organizational structure has been kept as simple as possible 
and there is no communication and co-operation between Inditex’s different brands or 
even Zara’s three own product lines of course helps the flow and control of information, 
too. [64; 58] 
 
One of Zara’s vital IT tool are the customized handheld computers (=PDAs) that Zara’s 
store personnel use. With help of these PDAs (as well as regular phone conversations), 
the store personnel are able to forward a lot of different and important information to 
Zara’s headquarters in La Coruña. This information includes for example quantitative 
data about how new products have sold and what products need to be ordered to the 
store, as well as e.g. more general consumers feedback. [66] 
 
Ferdows, Lewis and Machucha also note, that IT tools are present during Zara’s product 
development phase, too. For example: the designers only refine suitable colors and 
textures for a product after and not before the product prototype has been chosen for 
production. They do this with help of computer-aided design system. Also, if the 
product chosen for production is made in Zara’s own factory, they transfer the product 
specifications – such as cutting information for example – to all the related machines in 
the factory in question. [66] 
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Barcodes are another vital factor in keeping Zara’s supply chains and product flow 
quick and efficient. The barcodes do not only apply for ready products – they are used 
throughout the whole production process from tracking down cut pieces to sewing and 
packing of the products. [66] Also, as was mentioned earlier, the distribution center’s 
tracking system uses barcodes to assign products into their suitable places in the center. 
According to Butler, when an order is placed and approved, the system then allocates 
products through the ceiling rails into separate boxes according to each store’s needs. 
Obviously, the stores communicate their orders for the distribution center as barcodes. 
[65] 
 
As to which store orders are approved and which are not, Zara uses computer 
algorithms to help in the decision-making. Zara has developed these algorithms in co-
operation with Massachusett’s Institute of Technology, and they are designed to come 
up with the proper mix of stock-keeping units for each store. Although Zara’s 
managers’ actions are guided by the suggestions produced by these algorithms, they are 
able to adjust the orders manually, too. [65] 
 
It should be noted, however, that it is not only the certain IT tools Zara uses that have 
enabled it to be as efficient as it – it is the way it uses them. Every aspect in the 
company’s operations has been analyzed and optimized for the IT tools. For example: it 
is not uncommon for a fashion retailer to use the PDAs as help in the communication 
between different parties (like for example store personnel and production managers). 
Yet in order to make the most of this kind of communication and prevent vital 
information from getting lost within the different organizational levels, Zara has e.g. 
decided to keep its organizational structure as flat as possible. Or: within a week, one 
Zara-store can, instead of dealing with just one general market specialist, receive three 
separate phone calls from Zara’s headquarters in La Coruña – from each of the market 
specialists in Zara’s three product lines. And also: Zara does not solely and blindly rely 
on its electronically collected data, but highly values word-of-mouth information from 
Zara’s retail managers, too.  [66; 70] 
4.1.4.4 Flexibility 
 
As a result of the vertical integration, centralized distribution system and clever 
utilization of IT tools, Zara has achieved a highly flexible production system. Usually, 
according to Ferdows, Lewis and Machuca, a small change in e.g. retail orders can 
result in much bigger fluctuations in a factory’s orders because it goes through so many 
different levels (e.g. wholesalers and distributors) before being received by the factory 
in charge of the production. Therefore, when a selling season has started, traditional 
fashion retailers are only able to make changes to 20 % of their orders at the highest. 
Yet in the case of Zara, it is able to make changes to 40 to 50 % of its orders. [66] 
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Zara’s flexibility also comes from well thought out little things. For example, 
approximately half of all the fabric Zara buys is bought as undyed, so that the company 
can postpone decisions regarding which color products to produce until later during the 
season. [64, p. 11] Related to this, Zara’s designers also develop their designs using 
fabrics and trims that are already available instead of having to wait for the fabric first 
being processed. In other words: Zara’s design process’s starting point is to focus on 
what they already have and what could be made of that, instead of first designing what 
could made and only then, looking at what would be needed for the designs. [70, p. 2] 
Also, as was already mentioned before, Zara’s designers only refine suitable colors and 
textures for a product after and not before the product prototype has been chosen for 
production, and they have been advised to e.g. restrict the number of changes they make 
to a product prototype so that the development process and speed to market are as quick 
as possible, too. [66; 70, p. 2] 
 
The need for flexibility is also taken into consideration in Zara’s operations before 
actual production decisions have even been made: even though it is more expensive for 
Zara, the company has decided to invest in high-tech factory equipment and extra 
factory capacity, just to be prepared for any unexpected increases in production or other 
unexpected changes. This is something only very few subcontractors for example in 
Asia would be able to do. [67] Yet clearly, Zara has been able to make this investment 
work for their favor, considering their exceptionally short lead times and the small 
amount of unsold products compared to many other fashion retailers.  
4.2 American Apparel 
Like Zara, American Apparel is a vertically integrated fashion retailer and in addition to 
Zara, also a whosesaler. Whereas Zara is a European fashion retailer, American 
Apparel, like the name suggests, has its roots in the US. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: American Apparel -logo [73]. 
 
American Apparel (see Figure 4.6 for the company logo) sells women’s, men’s 
children’s and pet’s wear and also offers accessories. The company headquarters 
(pictured in Figure 4.7) are located in Los Angeles, California and it is the largest 
clothing manufacturing facility in North America [74]. By the end of 2014, American 
Apparel employed approximately 10 000 people worldwide and had altogether 239 
stores in 20 countries with net sales worth of 609 million US dollars[75]. 
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Figure 4.7: American Apparel's headquarters in LA, California [76]. 
 
The company was founded by Dov Charney, originally at the end of the eighties, and it 
was settled in Los Angeles in 1997. After that, the company has had ups and downs 
along its way. For example in 2008, the Guardian awarded American Apparel as the 
label of the year [77]. Yet the more recent developments of the company include a filing 
for bankruptcy on October 5th, 2015 [78].  
4.2.1 Company history 
 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, Dov Charney, a Canadian born in 1969, is 
the founder of American Apparel. He originally started his business at the end of the 
eighties, while still in boarding school, by importing Hanes’ and Fruit of the Loom’s T-
shirts from the United States to Canada, where he then sold them to his friends. He 
continued with that in college, where his T-shirt business evolved into a small 
wholesale business that was operated through his college dorm room. Eventually, he 
ended up quitting college in his third year in order to dedicate his time fully to his T-
shirt business. At this time, he began manufacturing the T-shirts as well, with the help 
of a $10 000 loan from his father. [77; 79; 80] 
 
American Apparel was shortly set in the state of South Carolina. But in 1997, Charney 
moved the company to Los Angeles, which has been American Apparel’s home ever 
since. The move to the current headquarters, which today employs about 3000 people 
[81], happened in 2000 [82]. There, American Apparel first continued as a 
manufacturing wholesale business until expanding into direct retailing in 2003 (while 
also continuing with wholesale), in hopes of being able to cover all the debts the 
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company had managed to attain throughout the years.  So, the first American Apparel 
store was opened in Los Angeles in 2003. [77; 79; 80] 
 
After 2003, the company expanded quickly: in 2004, American Apparel started 
operating in Europe and in 2005, altogether 65 new stores where opened. During that 
time, Charney was named “entrepreneur of the year” by the company Ernst & Young, 
as well as “man of the year” by the Apparel magazine.  [77; 80] 
 
By 2006, according to MarketWatch, American Apparel had managed to gain market 
share and was able to compete with bigger, well-known American fashion retailers such 
as GAP for example [80]. Further in 2008, as was mentioned previously, American 
Apparel was named the label of the year by Guardian magazine. [77] Yet after 2009, the 
company has failed to generate any profit and eventually, before almost going bankrupt 
in 2009 and 2011 [81], had to file for bankruptcy in October, 2015. [78; 83] 
 
Already before filing for bankruptcy in October 2015, Dov Charney had been replaced 
as CEO of American Apparel by Paula Schneider. American Apparel decided in 
December 2014 to end Charney’s employment as the company CEO due to different 
scandals, media controversies and legal troubles he had gotten himself into. [84] 
4.2.2 Business characteristics 
 
According to Stoel, there are two factors that make American Apparel a unique clothing 
company. Those factors are that it has both environmentally and socially responsible 
production methods and that it is a US based clothing producer (which already is unique 
on its own) that is involved both in wholesale and retail businesses. [85] 
 
Also, in contrast to Zara, which does not really advertise its products at all, American 
Apparel has always been known for its very bold and provocative advertisements. 
Within the years, American Apparel’s advertisements have many times featured posters 
of models wearing nothing more than the item they are advertising – from socks and 
underwear to bodysuits (see Figure 4.8 for a fairly moderate example). According to 
Zerbo, the purpose of these kinds of advertisements is to increase consumer’s awareness 
of the company. The bold advertisements have also have been a major factor in molding 
the company’s identity. [80] Like American Apparel itself describes: “The American 
Apparel advertising campaign has become a synonymous with our brand name as the 
signature Made in the USA basics that first put us on the map.” [86] 
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Figure 4.8: American Apparel’s ad from January 2015 [86]. 
 
The bold advertisements have indeed been a good way for American Apparel to distinct 
the company from its competitors as American Apparels’s products themselves are not 
really the most high-fashion products but rather basic cotton T-shirts and sweaters. 
Another thing that is a big part of American Apparel’s identity and that it also has used 
as a way to stand out, as was noted in the aforementioned statement, is its USA made 
products (see Figure 4.9). The US production has always been an important factor of 
business for Charney, who has been given credit for supporting the US clothing industry 
instead of using cheap overseas sweatshops [87]. All the American Apparel’s products 
are designed, produced and shipped from its Los Angeles headquarters [74], and the 
employees are treated fairly – for example they are paid better than what the minimum 
wage in California is and they are entitled to free English lessons, parking and an 
$8/week health insurance among other things. [87] 
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Figure 4.9: American Apparel’s ad from March 2015 [86]. 
 
Also, as was mentioned earlier, one unique thing about American Apparel is that is 
involved both in retail and wholesale businesses. After the company started with its 
retail operations by opening its very first own store in 2003, it has increased its store 
numbers quite quickly and massively leading to 242 stores at the end of 2014 [75]. 
According to the company founder, Dov Charney, the opening of the stores was a 
necessary move in order to make consumers more aware of American Apparel’s brand. 
Yet other instances have described American Apparel’s store opening strategy as “rapid 
over-expansion” and one reason behind the company’s struggles. [80] These description 
are not that far-fetched: the 200+ stores with around 5000 employees only amounted to 
31,4 percent of the company’s $609 million revenue in 2014, and the numbers only 
seem to be decreasing. The wholesale sector on the other hand contributed to 34,4 
percent of the 2014’s revenue with a 5,1 percent increase from previous. [80; 88] 
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4.2.3 Products 
 
American Apparel’s product range is quite big – it consists of women’s, men’s, 
children’s and even pet’s (see Figure 4.10) wear and accessories. It is particularly 
known for its cotton basic products [77]. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: American Apparel’s ¾ sleeve dog raglan [89]. 
 
American Apparel itself has, according to Stoel, described its style as “iconic, clean, 
simple and timeless”. [85] This can also clearly be seen from American Apparel’s 
products. The company has always avoided logos and it is not known for wild patterns 
but for its simple Y-front cotton shirts the company founder, Charney, is also often seen 
wearing  [77].  
 
Yet although the design of American Apparel’s product is often really simple and plain, 
what is unique for the company’s products is that they are offered in a large variety of 
different colors (see Figure 4.11) – from basic colors to more trendy colors to even very 
bright and flashy colors. [80; 85] 
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Figure 4.11: American Apparel’s wholesale hoodie sell sheet from September 7th 2012. 
[90] 
 
Similarly to Zara, American Apparel is a vertically integrated fashion retailer. Yet 
whereas Zara has really made the most of having its manufacturing and retailing 
activities closely tied to one another by bringing small batches of new products to the 
markets as often as every two weeks, American Apparel’s approach has been a lot more 
traditional. American Apparel’s products are not as trendy and fashionable as Zara’s 
and it is known for bringing new products to the market a lot less frequently and also, in 
larger amounts. [80] 
4.2.4 Key operational features 
 
In this chapter, American Apparel’s key operational features are looked into. As has 
been established, American Apparel has not been performing too well ever since 2009. 
Therefore, existing research and articles are used to get a better understanding behind 
the struggles the company has been facing and also, to establish whether the short 
supply chains have had any – positive or negative – effect on them. 
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4.2.4.1 Vertical integration 
 
Like Zara, American Apparel is a vertically integrated company: All American 
Apparel’s products are designed, produced and shipped from its California based 
facilities. And, unlike Zara, who has outsourced e.g. its low value-adding sewing 
activities to mostly close-by sewing workshops, American Apparel has really kept hold 
of all of its activities related to the production of a clothing item.  [74] American 
Apparel’s vertically integrated supply chain model is presented in Figure 4.12. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12: American Apparel’s supply chain model in a nutshell [91]. 
 
All of the American Apparel’s main facilities are located in the California area. Besides 
the company headquarters and factory in Los Angeles, American Apparel has also a 
fabric dyeing and finishing facility in Hawthorne, a knitting facility in Los Angeles, a 
knitting, dyeing, cutting and sewing facility for fabrics in Garden Grove, a dyeing 
facility for ready clothing items in South Gate and lastly, centralized distribution facility 
in La Mirada. As for the distribution, American Apparel has outsourced the actual 
transportation of the products to Fresh Air Freight and trucking companies. Also, the 
company uses one of its subsidiaries for replenishments of its US retail stores. 
However, possibly the most unique thing about the vertical integration of American 
Apparel is that the company’s own employees both model and photograph the pictures 
the company uses in its advertisements. [91] 
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Whereas Zara has, with the help of vertical integration, created an incredibly quick and 
effective production network, American Apparel’s and Dov Charney’s goal with 
vertical integration always seems to have been first and foremost to guarantee socially 
and ecologically responsible production methods. American Apparel itself states that by 
having all of its activities from designing, knitting, dyeing and cutting to sewing and 
storage under the same roof, the company can ensure that e.g. all the needed US 
environmental regulations are being obeyed and the employees treated fairly. [74] 
 
When compared to clothing industry workers in general, the American Apparel 
employees are indeed doing quite well. In 2007, California’s minimum wage was $6,75 
per hour but with their performance-related hourly fee, the American Apparel’s 
employees were able to make $12 per hour on average – which is almost double the 
minimum wage. Also, as was mentioned earlier, the employees, who largely consists of 
immigrants, are offered a health insurance that costs them $8 per week, inexpensive 
full-family health care, free English lessons, properly lit and ventilated workspaces, free 
parking, company subsidized meals and free international phone-calls during work 
days. [77; 87]  
 
Of course, this kind of commitment to employees’ working conditions is, for a fashion 
retailer, honorable and frustratingly rare. Yet these kinds of benefits are also not cheap 
for American Apparel. According to The Economist, the subsidized health insure costs 
about 4 to 5 million dollars per year for the company and e.g. the meals about $500 000 
yearly. [87] 
 
Like is the case with Zara, American Apparel’s stores are also operated and owned by 
the company itself. In addition to the costly worker benefits, the stores have been a 
major expenditure for the company and nowadays, their sales only contribute to about 
30 % of the company’s yearly revenue As was mentioned earlier, when American 
Apparel first started with its retail business, its store numbers expanded quickly and 
according to many instances, too quickly. Several stores were opened over a short 
period of time (150 stores within the first three years of retail business and almost twice 
as many in the next three years, too [77]) in order to make the new retail customers 
aware of the brand. [80] In the end, the large number of stores only credited to even 
more debt for the company and the financial crisis and the following recession did, on 
their part, not help the company’s situation either [77]. So now, with the new American 
Apparel CEO, one of the company’s key intentions is to close down several of the 
company’s stores that have not been performing well and instead focus on fewer, fast-
growing locations and also, enhance the company’s e-commerce and wholesale 
channels [92]. 
 
With the filing for bankruptcy, not only has the number of stores but also, the 
profitability of American Apparel’s US manufacture in general, been brought into 
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question. While the company itself has adamantly stated that it will continue with its US 
based manufacture – “You can’t have American Apparel without apparel made in 
America” [93] – other instances have commented, that in order for the company to save 
itself, it will either have to offshore its production or invest in expensive factory 
automation equipment and robotics. [85; 93] 
4.2.4.2 Centralized distribution 
 
Like Zara, American Apparel has a centralized distribution system that is located as of 
2013 in La Mirada, California. Before that, the distribution center was located in the 
company’s Los Angeles downtown factory. [94] 
 
According to American Apparel, by having all of its activities executed in the same 
California area, the company can bring products to the market quickly and effectively 
[91]. Yet when considering American Apparel’s old distribution center, the company’s 
operations do not seem the most effective. As mentioned above, before moving to the 
new distribution center in La Mirada in 2013, American Apparel’s centralized 
distribution was carried out from their downtown Los Angeles factory (see e.g. Figure 
4.7 for reference). That factory is, as a working space, reportedly really narrow and only 
has small freight elevators. So, when the distribution center was there, all products had 
to be processed and moved by hand. This means that the distribution center employees 
were processing orders by reading an order sheet and manually collecting the ordered 
products into a shopping cart (see Figures 4.13 & 4.14). [94] 
 
 
Figure 4.13: American Apparel’s distribution employee collecting an order in the 
company’s old distribution center [94]. 
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Figure 4.14: Inside American Apparel’s old distribution center [94]. 
 
The new American Apparel distribution center however is automated (see Figure 4.15). 
According to the company, the new distribution center was build because the company 
needed both quicker distribution system and more space for it. So, the new center is a 
little over 23 200 square meters big and unlike the old downtown working space with its 
7 stories, flat. It also has e.g. auto-piloted cars that run up and down through the product 
aisles, an automated conveyor belt that only runs when products are placed on it, 
energy-efficient lighting and easy loading places for trucks picking up orders. [94; 95] 
 
 
Figure 4.15: American Apparel’s new distribution center [95]. 
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The new American Apparel distribution center is, of course, worlds apart from the 
company’s old distribution center. Yet when compared to e.g. Zara’s distribution center, 
which Zara started building already in 2003 [63], it does still seem a bit more moderate. 
Of course the comparison to Zara’s distribution center is somewhat unfair – many 
fashion retailers have looked up to it and tried to duplicate it [65]. But when considering 
the financial hardships American Apparel has had over the years, it does seem a little 
peculiar that the move to a much more effective distribution system happened so late in 
the company’s operations and e.g. only after almost going bankrupt twice [81]. 
4.2.4.3 Flexibility & product offering 
 
According to Dov Charney himself, the reason for keeping all the production activities 
under American Apparel’s own roof is not only to guarantee socially and ecologically 
responsible production methods but also, to be able to respond quickly to new trends 
and changes in demand [87]. On its homepages, American Apparel for example states, 
that its vertically integrated production system enables the company to have better 
flexibility and quicker lead times than many other actors in the market [91]. Yet when 
considering other fashion retailers’ products, American Apparel’s product offering with 
its mostly basic cotton products does not seem that diverse – despite the versatile colors 
the products come with. Also, the company is more known for bringing big batches of 
new products to the markets with a more traditional schedule than focusing on new, 
trendy products and offering them more quickly but in smaller amounts [80]. 
 
The fact that American Apparel has not been fully utilizing the flexibility its vertically 
integrated production system should be well suited for, has also been contributed to one 
the reasons behind the company’s struggles. For example, according to Zerbo, 
American Apparel’s problem is that the company fails to provide its young costumers, 
who after all are the company’s target market [96], sufficient amounts of trendy and 
fashionable clothing items [80]. Stoel also comments, that American Apparel has failed 
to make its products seem unique to its customers in a market where the most basic 
products are really similar with each other and competition therefore tough and also, 
largely based on product price. Stoel even argues that in order for American Apparel to 
save itself and be able to respond to the heavy price competition, the company will 
either have to outsource its production to cheaper countries or truly make it production 
flexible enough (by e.g. investing in robotics and automated production) so that the U.S. 
based production costs can be covered. [85] 
 
Not only has the need for more versatile product offering and schedule been brought up 
by different media outlets – American Apparel itself has also acknowledged this need. 
Therefore, as a part of the company’s new turnaround plan, it was announced in the 
summer of 2015 that American Apparel would, for the first time ever, bring a fall 
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collection of men’s and women’s “advanced basics and key items” to the market. 
Usually, the fall season has not been one of the focal points in the company’s operations 
but with the fall collection, American Apparel wanted to start the process of renewing 
its product offering and increasing its productivity by SKU. [92] 
 
The launch of the fall collection did however not go as was originally planned. Because 
of the low amount of capital American Apparel had due to its debts and bankruptcy, the 
company was able to produce only 15 % to 20 % of the new fall collection’s products – 
the rest it simply could not afford. This was, of course, a letdown for American 
Apparel. Yet the company has stated that it plans on continuing with the creation of new 
styles and freshening up the product offering. Whether that, together with closing down 
of underperforming stores and other actions in the turnaround plan, will be enough to 
save the company and enable it to stay in the California area, remains to be seen. Many 
instances argue that it is inevitable for the company to start offshorting at least some 
parts of the company’s production especially as Los Angeles plans to raise its minimum 
wage to $15 per hour by the year 2020. [93] 
4.3 Zara and American Apparel: Quantitative comparison 
In this chapter, Zara’s and American Apparel’s operations and performance are 
compared based on different key figures in order to get a better understanding of the 
differences between the companies. 
 
In Figure 4.16, Zara’s and American Apparel’s net sales between 2004 and 2014 are 
first compared. It is clear from the figure that not only is Zara’s scale of operation a lot 
bigger than American Apparel’s but that it has also been able to increase its sales quite 
successfully throughout the years. Compared to Zara, American Apparel’s net sales 
have on the other hand only increased very little. As a result, the difference between the 
companies’ net sales has increased by a staggering 198 percent between the ten-year 
time frame. 
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Figure 4.16: Zara’s and American Apparel’s net sales between 2004-2014 (based on 
[97; 98]). 
 
In figure 4.17 the companies’ store numbers between 2007 and 2014 are compared. 
Again it is obvious from the figure that Zara operates in a lot larger scale than American 
Apparel. Also, similarly to Zara’s net sales, Zara’s store numbers also increase steadily 
throughout the years whereas American Apparel’s store numbers actually start to 
decrease after 2009. As was discussed in the previous chapter, American Apparel’s 
store opening strategy has been described as rapid over-expansion and after the 
financial crisis, the company was, at the latest, forced to decrease its store numbers. The 
change in the difference between the companies’ store numbers is not as drastic as the 
change in the difference between the net sales (although the time frame is different in 
the figures, too) but still, the difference has increased by 56 percent in the seven years 
presented in the figure. 
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Figure 4.17: Zara’s and American Apparel’s store numbers between 2007-2014 (based 
on [97; 98]). 
 
In Figure 4.18, Zara’s contribution to Inditex’s sales between 2004 and 2014 is 
presented. This is because in the following figure, Inditex’s and American Apparel’s 
gross- and net profit margin percentages are compared as there was no data available on 
solely Zara’s gross- and net profit margin percentages. Overall, Zara’s sales have grown 
at a similar rate to Inditex’s sales and Zara’s share of Inditex’s whole sales has been 
about 65 percent from 2004 to 2014. 
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Figure 4.18: Zara’s share of Inditex’s net sales between 2004-2014 (based on [97]). 
 
In Figure 4.19, Inditex’s and American Apparel’s gross- and net profit margin 
percentages between 2004 and 2014 are compared. As has been established, in this 
study gross margin is understood as the difference between the acquisition costs of 
products sold and the actual sales and it is one measure of profitability. Net profit then 
again is another measure for profitability and understood as the profit that remains after 
all costs have been subtracted from the sales. [5]  
 
The results in Figure 4.19 are really interesting – both Zara and American Apparel have 
had very similar gross margin percentages (around 56% and 50 %) between 2004-2014. 
Yet when comparing the actual net profit percentages, there is a clear difference. 
Whereas Zara has been able to make profit and maintain about 13 % net profit 
percentage between the presented ten-year time frame, American Apparel’s net profit 
percentage has been negative ever since 2009 meaning after 2009, the company has 
failed to generate any profit. This means that the direct costs related to both of the 
companies’ products are manageable and both companies can generate quite good gross 
margin percentages but then again in American Apparel’s case, the indirect costs of the 
company’s operations are too much for the company to handle. 
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Figure 4.19: Inditex’s and American Apparel’s gross margin percentage and net profit 
percentage between 2004-2014 (based on [98; 99]). 
 
In table 4.1, Figure 4.19’s results are presented but in a table-form. 
 
Table 4.1: Inditex’s and American Apparel’s gross margin percentage and net profit 
percentage between 2004-2014 (based on [98; 99]). 
Year 
Gross margin [%] Net margin [%] 
American Apparel Inditex American Apparel Inditex 
2004 42,1 55,4 4,7 11,5 
2005 50,5 56,2 1,7 11,9 
2006 51,1 56,2 -0,6 12,2 
2007 55,7 56,7 4,0 13,3 
2008 54,9 56,8 2,6 12,0 
2009 57,3 57,1 0,2 11,9 
2010 52,5 59,3 -16,2 13,8 
2011 53,9 59,3 -7,2 14,0 
2012 53,0 59,8 -6,0 14,8 
2013 50,6 59,3 -16,8 14,2 
2014 50,7 58,3 -11,3 13,8 
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5 ANALYSIS 
The reasons for outsourcing of production to offshore locations are clear. In a labor-
intensive industry, where labor costs make up to 60 % of total production costs, cheaper 
labor can undeniably offer fashion retailers huge savings. Also, as the manufacture of 
fashion industry’s products is not technologically very challenging, outsourcing of 
production does not seem risky from that perspective, either. Yet when considering the 
quick development of digital media and the pressure it puts on fashion retailers in terms 
of lead times and product availability, as well as the often socially and ecologically 
questionable working conditions of the offshore production sites, it is justified to 
speculate whether the savings on the labor costs truly overshadow all the other issues 
and problems related to the offshore production. 
 
Research, quite understandably, suggests that fashion retailers who are able to meet the 
demand best are the most successful ones. Or, if a fashion retailer is able to build a 
brand so strong that it can fight against the mainstream fashion trends, it can be 
successful, too – although it might still operate in a niche market. Still: the fact that 
about a third of fashion retailers’ products need to be sold with discounted prices 
suggests that meeting the demand is very challenging and that there is room for 
improvement within the fashion industry’s supply chains. 
 
One important factor related to the demand and availability of the products is that it is 
not enough that the products are quickly available – they must appeal to the customers, 
too. This is also apparent in the Kelano-project [5]: the fast service companies, despite 
the fact that they had products enter their stores quickly, had e.g. the lowest actual 
mark-up, gross margin percentage and gross margin return on investment (GMROI). 
The fast service companies utilized vendor-managed inventory –strategy to attain fast 
product availability. This means that they made actual purchase decisions about the 
products already before the start of a selling season, but had the product supplier 
manage their inventory and make replenishments when products were running out. As 
the actual mark-up is calculated by dividing actual sales with purchases, huge discounts 
have a negative effect on it: the more products are sold with discounts, the poorer the 
sales and therefore, the actual mark-up. The fast service companies’ actual mark-up was 
only 1,44 on average so they were not making that much profit with their products. For 
comparison: in the Kelano-project, the fast fashion companies had an actual mark-up of 
2,44 on average and the brand builder companies 2,36. In other word: these companies 
had either more fashionable or unique design, so their offering probably met the 
demand better than the design of the fast service companies – hence, they had better 
sales and were probably not as forced to e.g. sell discounted products. Also, with the 
lowest actual mark-ups, it is no wonder the fast service companies also had the lowest 
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gross margin percentage and gross margin return on investment. For example, the fast 
service companies’ GMROI was only 1,22 (fast fashion companies 5,97, brand builder 
companies 3,23) meaning they were selling their products only with a little higher 
prices than with what they had acquired them for. 
 
This is not to say vendor-managed inventory –strategy is not a good strategy for fashion 
retailers. On the contrary: it can be quite a good strategy. For example, in Heikki 
Mattila’s dissertation [6], the results indicate that a fashion retailer can, by utilizing a 
VMI-strategy, better its retail performance. Yet the key element is, as also Mattila 
points out, that sufficient attention is paid on forecast accuracy and demand-drivenness. 
In other words: if the products do not correlate with the demand, having them quickly 
available won’t help, but if the products meet the demand, a fashion retailer can very 
well benefit from having the product supplier manage its inventory and make 
replenishments of popular products once they are running out.  
 
So, it all comes down to meeting the demand. And to be able to meet the demand, a 
fashion retailer should postpone purchase and production decisions to as late as possible 
to lessen the possibility of forecast errors. Zara is a good example of this: its lead time 
for a completely new product is four weeks and it is one of the largest fashion retailers 
in the world and has even managed to stay productive throughout the latest recession. 
Of course Zara has been perfecting its unique operating system for many years and it is 
not possible for a random fashion retailer to just try to mimic it. Yet still: research 
indicates that even by engaging itself only partly to shorter supply chains and more 
local production, a fashion retailer could succeed better in the competitive fashion 
market. 
 
Of course saying that by using shorter supply chains a fashion retailer will 
automatically be successful, is too simple. There are also other factors that should be 
taken into account. One of these factors is the product offering of the fashion retailer. 
For example: it the retailer mainly sells basic products that are not as easily subjected to 
unpredictable changes in demand as more trendy products are, longer lead times and 
supply chains might be the best solution. Also, if the retailer’s products are really 
unique and do not follow the mainstream fashion trends, production in that case does 
not necessarily has to be really quick and effective, either – especially if later 
replenishment are not needed. Another factor is the utilization of the shorter supply 
chains: if the fashion retailer does not know how to integrate its operations to work well 
with the possible quicker production or does not have the proper technology for that 
(e.g. use of POS-information) the shorter supply chains might just end up costing the 
retailer more. In a way, American Apparel is a good example of many of the 
aforementioned things: it has its own production facilities in immediate proximity to its 
headquarters and main consumer markets yet its products are rather more basic than 
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really fashionable and also, it does not bring new products to the market quickly but 
rather in a more traditional schedule. 
 
One thing that should not be neglected either when talking about the possible benefits of 
shorter supply chains is the fact that both of the case companies looked into in this study 
were vertically integrated. This means that for them, shorter supply chains and close-by 
production are more or less given. Yet this is not the fact with many other, not vertically 
integrated fashion retailers and companies. In fact: if the fashion retailer is small – 
which majority of the fashion retailers are – it might not have the needed power and 
connections to create a quick and effective deal with a more close-by producer. Rather, 
if it decides to use this kind of producer, its order might be processed only after the 
producer has carried out bigger orders from more influential retailers. As the market is 
already dominated by a small amount of big retailers and now, with the clothing 
industrial base deteriorating in the EU and US, this problem is only accentuated as there 
may not be enough skilled professionals and facilities to handle all the orders in the 
needed time frame.  
 
The poor infrastructure of EU’s and US’s clothing industry is indeed something fashion 
retailers considering more local production should take into account. The fact that there 
are not that many producers left, which might result in longer lead times, is not the only 
problem. Another problem is that the producers are often too specialized in a certain 
process and not product, meaning they might not be able to handle a retailer’s order 
from start to finish. Instead, the retailer might have to use multiple different producers, 
who might be scattered across EU/US. This again decreases the benefits a retailer might 
hope to attain with the more local producers – even though the producers used might 
operate closer to the retailer than e.g. Asian producers. Having to circulate the order and 
product from one producer to another does not make the supply chains straightforward 
and shorter but rather, maybe even more complex. 
 
This is also a subject matter that Vogler-Ludwig and Valente handled in their research 
[27] regarding the future of European TLC-industries. According to them, for Europe to 
be able to strengthen its TCL-industries, there has to be strong support and investments 
in vocational training, new industrial policies as well as improvement of the existing 
innovative culture. In other words, for EU’s (as well as US’s) clothing industry to 
redeem itself and try to bring production back on a larger scale, it has to be a joint effort 
with governmental support. Otherwise, as the fashion industry is extremely competitive 
and also large based on product price, it is very difficult for an individual fashion 
retailer or producer to try to fight against the cheaper, offshore labor. Especially since 
entry barriers for a starting fashion retailers are already high and production then again 
is not as profitable and internationally very competitive. 
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When talking about shorter supply chains and more local production, environmental 
issues are often referred to, as well. There indeed are some clear environmental benefits 
that can be achieved with this kind of production. For example: by using more close-by 
producers, retailers can often get rid of unnecessary middlemen (e.g. traders) within the 
supply chain. As a result, the supply chain is not only shorter and quicker, but also more 
traceable. Therefore, it is easier for the retailer to monitor that the producer is obeying 
all the needed safety and environmental regulations. Of course the matter is not always 
that black and white but generally, the lesser actors there are in the supply chain, the 
easier it is to mange and monitor. Also, as the environmental laws are often a little 
stricter in the EU and US than e.g. in many places in Asia, the production is often a bit 
more sustainable in those places, too. Another good thing about the short supply chains 
in terms of environment is that with them, the retailer can postpone production 
decisions closer to the start of a selling season meaning the products will more likely 
meet the demand and hence, less unwanted products are produced. 
 
Yet, as it is with everything, there are also some more negative things related to the 
shorter supply chains and environment. For example with Zara: even though its sell-
through percentage is high and only a small amount of its products need to discounted, 
one could question how sustainable it is to bring new products to the market as often as 
every two weeks. Of course e.g. Zara can argue that it uses sustainable materials and 
production methods but still, its business model rather encourages consumerism than 
moderate and thoughtful purchases. Research also indicates that Zara’s stores are visited 
considerably more frequently than many other, more traditional fashion retailers’ stores. 
So, from this point of view, American Apparel’s model could be considered more 
sustainable in terms of its decision to focus on more basic, good quality and long-lasting 
cotton wear with a high emphasis on environmentally friendly production. However, 
when it comes to succeeding in the fashion market, this has not been the best possible 
strategy and therefore, also American Apparel is now forced to being more demand-
driven and offering more fashionable products alongside their cotton basics. 
 
Fashion industry’s impact on the environment is not the main topic of this study so 
clearly, there are a lot more environmental issues related to fashion industry’s supply 
chains that have not been covered within this study. But it could be said that local 
production and shorter supply chains are not automatically the more environmentally 
friendly solution – for example the retailer and its business strategy play a key role, too 
– yet they do offer a lot of good possibilities for carrying out more sustainable, traceable 
and demand-driven production. 
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5.1 Zara vs. American Apparel 
Zara and American Apparel offer an interesting comparison as they are both vertically 
integrated fashion retailers that own a big part if not all of their production facilities but 
that have had very different outcomes in the fashion market. 
 
Although the main outlines of the two case companies are really similar, they posses a 
lot of differences as well. For example: Zara offers trendy and fashionable products but 
does not advertise (almost) at all, whereas American Apparel is known for very edgy 
and provocative ad campaigns but also, for more basic and plain products. Or: Zara has 
from the start positioned itself as a retailer that understands fashion and brings new and 
interesting products to the market quickly whereas American Apparel has always rather 
emphasized its made in the USA –image, environmental awareness and fair treatment of 
its workers. 
 
There are also differences with the production methods, too, although both of the 
companies e.g. have their own factories. Whereas Zara’s take on the vertical integration 
is a little bit more subtle, American Apparel has really kept hold of all of the activities 
related to its product’s life cycle. Zara, too, does a big part of its own manufacturing, 
but it has outsourced the manufacture of the more basic products to offshore producers 
as well as all the sewing, which is the most labor-intensive yet not that value-adding 
part of the production. 
 
Overall, Zara’s actions seem more thought-out than American Apparel’s. One could 
even say that Zara has been able to transform its effective production to an overall 
company culture because all of its activities from small details to bigger entities are so 
well planned out and deliberate. This is for example reflected in the fact that it treats its 
three product lines as separate entities, buys about half of its fabrics as undyed and 
starts its design process by looking at what fabrics are already available, as well the fact 
that it has invested in high-tech factory equipment and extra factory capacity and that it 
makes shipments from its distribution center in stages, based on different time zones. 
When compared to that, American Apparel’s operations from its old, ineffective 
distribution center to not as well thought-out product lines and offering do seem a bit 
more all over the place. 
 
Yet still: when Zara’s and American Apparel’s gross margin percentages are compared, 
both of the companies have managed to generate gross margin percentages of over 50 
from 2004 to 2014. From this point of view, American Apparel’s production does not 
seem any less ineffective than Zara’s. On the contrary: American Apparel’s gross 
margin percentages are really good for a fashion retailer and state that it can generate 
good results with its made in the USA –products. Yet it is the net profit percentages 
where the differences between the companies begin. Whereas Zara’s net profit 
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percentage has stayed around 13 during the ten-year time frame, American Apparel has 
failed to generate any profit ever since 2009. This is to say that despite the good gross 
margins, American Apparel’s overall operation has not been effective and productive. 
 
There are a couple of factors that could be attributed to the cause of American Apparel’s 
troubles. One of these is the rapid store-expansion the company went through when it 
first started with retail. The store numbers and the maintenance costs related to them 
were clearly too much for the company to handle in the long run – hence why the 
company is now closing its underperforming stores. Then there are all the legal troubles 
American Apparel’s founder, Dov Charney, has gotten himself into. These have not 
only amounted to huge legal fees for American Apparel, but have most likely had a 
negative impact on the company’s brand, too. And as Gereffi [29] notes, brand name 
rents are one way for leading fashion retailers to gain leverage in the fashion markets, 
so a negative brand and company image might have huge effects for a fashion retailer 
and its success.  Also, related to the two aforementioned things, American Apparel has 
generated huge debt throughout the years – too huge for the company to be able to keep 
up with in the end. This is then again partly because American Apparel’s products have 
not really evolved and have therefore not been selling that well. Especially with the 
recession, people are less willing to spend their money on clothing, so the competition 
between fashion retailers has gotten extremely tough. And when looking at American 
Apparel’s net sales, it is clear that they have stagnated from 2008 on meaning, 
American Apparel has not been performing well in the even more competitive fashion 
market. 
 
So, from this point of view, it is not the more expensive local production and shorter 
supply chains that are the ultimate cause for American Apparel’s downfall. However, it 
can be speculated whether the bankruptcy could have been avoided had American 
Apparel been more demand-driven and utilized its vertically integrated production 
network even more to bring new, trendier and better-selling products to the market. 
Now, after filing for bankruptcy, American Apparel needs to really optimize its 
operations to be able to save itself. This means that there are probably going to be 
changes in the production methods, too, as already was the case with the new 
distribution center. Whether the changes include just optimizing of the US 
manufacturing or switching to offshore producers, remains to be seen. Yet when 
compared to Zara’s operations, there is room for improvement with American Apparel 
in terms of efficiency and thoughtfulness. 
 
The two case companies showcase that fashion industry is a really hard industry and 
there are no magic prescriptions that work well with every fashion retailer. On the 
contrary: there are a lot different aspects and elements that need to work in order for the 
fashion retailer to be successful. Among these elements are e.g. the product offering of 
the fashion retailer, its marketing strategy, the size of the retailer and the resources it has 
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available, the willingness of the retailer to share information (e.g. POS-information) 
with the producer and the technology the retailer has at its disposal. Majority of these 
elements are more related to e.g. R&D and marketing – i.e. the more value-adding 
activities in the clothing value chain – than the actual production. Yet to be able to 
achieve a lot these elements, well thought-out and flexible production and effectively 
managed supply chains are an absolute must for a fashion retailer.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
RQ1: What are the benefits shorter supply chains could offer for a fashion retailer? 
 
According to this study, there are some benefits fashion retailers could gain by utilizing 
shorter supply chains and more close-by producers. The main benefit is the fact that the 
retailer could postpone its purchase and production decisions closer to the start (and 
even during) of its selling season. This will lead to better forecast accuracy for the 
retailer meaning, less products would need to be sold with discounted prices or donated 
to charity. Also: with a close-by producer, it would be possible for the retailer to make 
replenishment orders of the most popular products as a) the producer is geographically 
close enough for it to be possible and b) because of improved demand forecasts, capital 
would not be tied to the unwanted products. The replenishments would result in less lost 
sales which, in terms of the retailer’s gross margin, have an even more negative effect 
on it than the unsold products. 
 
With the globally complex and dispersed supply chains, retailers often turn to traders 
and other middle men to help them link the retailer with potential producers and 
suppliers. With more local producers, this would not be as necessary. As a result, the 
supply chains would be quicker and more effective as unneeded actors are reduced from 
them, and also, probably more profitable, too, as they would not contain as many 
unnecessary stages that do not add any value to the product. Another benefit is that by 
getting rid of the unnecessary middle men, the supply chains would be easier to manage 
and the product more traceable meaning, the possibilities for carrying out more 
sustainable (ecologically and socially) production would increase. Also, quality issues 
could be tackled easier and quicker. 
 
Another benefit in terms of the environment would be that because of the improved 
demand forecasts, resources would not have to be wasted for the manufacture of 
redundant products. 
 
The idea with the shorter supply chains is that the retailer would be better prepared for 
unexpected changes in demand by having products available quicker. With this kind of 
system, one benefit is also, that inventory costs could decrease. This because the retailer 
would not need to make its full order well before the start of the selling season and 
therefore, have a huge inventory space for it, but it could make smaller orders more 
often and in an ideal case, have them enter the store directly without any need for in-
between storage. However, the ideal case is very hard to attain, so it is often safer for 
the retailer to have at least some kind of small buffer inventory available. 
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RQ2: What are the factors a fashion retailer considering shorter supply should pay 
attention to? 
 
There are many factors the fashion retailer should take into consideration before opting 
for more close-by producers and shorter supply chains. One important thing to look at is 
the retailer’s product offering. If the retailer sells basic items that do not change much 
from year to year and also, do not really require replenishments throughout the season, 
offshore production could in that case be considered the better option. Yet if the 
retailer’s product offering contains more fashionable items and bigger uncertainties and 
changes in demand, the better forecast accuracy related to more local sourcing could 
benefit the retailer. Also, it should be taken into account that the retailer does not need 
to use the shorter supply chains to source all of its products – it could still use the 
offshore producers for more basic items. 
 
Another thing to consider is what kind of retailer the retailer is – i.e. is it a branded 
retailer, vertically integrated retailer or for example, a branded manufacturer and also, 
how big the retailer is. This is related to what kind of knowledge and resources the 
retailer has at its disposal. For a vertically integrated retailer, local production could 
already be the reality or in any case, easier to organize than e.g. for a small branded 
retailer without any production-related technical or material know-how. Although 
fashion industry’s supply chains are buyer-driven, they are controlled by a small amount 
of big retailers that have been able to push the prices down. This puts a lot of pressure 
on small retailers and if they choose to use close-by producers, they should pay extra 
attention to choosing the producer and making sure it is reliable (i.e. it does not handle 
the retailer’s orders as last priority) or else the increased costs of the local production 
might get too overwhelming for the small retailers to handle. Of course small retailers 
often have a weaker positioning than bigger retailers when negotiating with offshore 
producers, too. So, in any case, it is important especially for a small retailer to carefully 
weight all the sourcing strategy’s costs in respect of its possible benefits before making 
any decisions. 
 
For the shorter supply chains to really be able to benefit the retailer, they have to be 
effective. Yet if the retailer is not a vertically integrated retailer meaning, it is in 
possession of e.g. its own manufacturing units, the effectiveness is not always that easy 
to achieve (although vertical integration is no absolute guarantee of effective 
production, either). To help with this, retailer should have the needed technology at its 
disposal. This means that e.g. point-of-sale software and information should be utilized 
and shared with the producer, so that actual demand can be monitored in real time. 
Inventory and distribution management should be well monitored and organized, too, so 
that it can support the effective production and prevent any unnecessary bottlenecks in 
the supply chain. Overall, the retailer should be willing to invest in modern technology 
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and equipment to truly be able to make the most of the benefits the shorter supply 
chains and local production can offer.  
 
It should not be neglected either, that it is not only the retailer’s dedication and input 
that matter – the producer plays an important role, too. Meaning it is not only the 
retailer whose technology needs to be in order but also, the producer. This might be a 
challenge for the retailers. This is related to the fact that manufacturing has over the 
years moved from the EU and US to Asia, where e.g. the machinery base is now often 
more advanced and producers are able to handle orders from start to finish in the same 
facility. With the EU and US clothing manufacturing industry deteriorating, the same 
effectiveness might be harder to achieve, especially on a larger scale. This is not to say 
EU/US production will never be as effective – just that the producer’s preparedness for 
quick and effective operation should be thoroughly analyzed before any collaboration. 
And overall: the retailer and producer need to rely on each other and be willing to e.g. 
share the POS-information or otherwise, the collaboration will most likely not be 
beneficial. 
6.1 Implications for future research 
As this study has been an exploratory research, the conclusions are not clear and 
undeniable truths but should rather be regarded as hypothesis and a basis for future 
research. In the future, more quantitative analysis on fashion retailers that prefer shorter 
supply chains as well as traditional fashion retailers (focusing on e.g. the same key 
figures presented in the Kelano-project) should be carried out to be able to analyze if the 
possible benefits mentioned in this study are also manifested in practice. Yet overall, 
with this kind of industry where there are a lot of different kinds of actors sharing the 
market, it is not possible to come up with a strategy that will work for every retailer. 
However, there clearly is some room for improvement with fashion retailers’ demand 
forecasting and supply chains, which the growth of digital media and the quicker than 
ever changing trends will most likely only accentuate.  
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